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In April of 2018 violent conflict broke out between the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups in 
southern Ethiopia, after 20 years of apparent stability. It is well established that many 
conflicts recur over time. This study aims to better understand why the Guji and Gedeo ethnic 
groups got into violent conflict again in 2018, after 20 years of relative stability. The key 
objectives are to shed light on what the main causes of the conflict are, why the conflict took 
place at this specific time, and whether it relates to the 1995 and 1998 conflicts between the 
same two groups. 
In the field semi-structured interviews were conducted with 37 informants from both groups, 
with an aim to interview people with different relations to the conflict, such as government 
officials, aid workers, IDPs and locals. The key findings of this thesis suggest that the issues 
at the core of the conflict revolve around territory and self-rule, under the ethnic federalism. 
In conclusion these causes shows large similarities with causes identified by previous 
researchers in the 1995 and 1998 conflict, indicating that this is a recurring conflict. It appears 
that these same core issues have resurfaced over an alleged proposal for a new referendum, 
regarding the administrative border, with certain elite actors as a driving force. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This research project is a 40 credits master thesis as part of a Master of Philosophy in Peace 
and Conflict Transformation, at the University of Tromsø, Norway. The fieldwork was 
conducted as part of a fieldwork exchange program between UiT and Dilla University in 
Ethiopia. 
In 2018 Africa was once again listed as the continent with the highest number of armed 
conflicts in the world. (Conflict Barometer 2018, p. 1) The continent of Africa has been 
plagued by conflicts of various kinds ever since the colonial rule of the continent came to an 
end, and in particular internal conflicts have been prominent. There are no indicators that this 
trend is slowing down as the number of internal conflicts have increased sharply in the last 
decade. (Bakken & Rustad, 2018, p. 13).  
Ethiopia, a country situated in the north-east, on the horn of Africa, has also experienced its 
fair share of conflict in the recent decades. Notably, it is clearly one of the more stable states 
on the horn of Africa, an otherwise fragile region. On the other hand Ethiopia is an extremely 
diverse country, made up of more than 80 recognized ethnic groups (Temesgen, 2015, pp. 1-
2). In the 30 year period of 1989-2018 there was a total of 54 internal armed conflicts 
registered in Ethiopia ("Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Gedeo-Guji),"). The same stats 
suggest that Ethiopia was the country with the second highest number of “battle-related 
Deaths from Internal Armed Conflicts” in the same period, only second to Syria (Knomea, 
2020). That in itself is an indicator of the serious problems that Ethiopia are facing, namely 
violent inter-group conflicts, which are argued to make up the biggest threat to the stability of 
the current government, not to mention a major threat to the security of the peoples in the 
conflict affected areas and in the country overall (Yusuf, 2019). 
In 2018 one such inter-group conflict broke out in southern Ethiopia. Violence erupted 
between the Guji and Gedeo neighbouring ethnic groups, after 20 years of relative stability. 
The Uppsala conflict data programme here reported 25 battle related deaths in the conflict 
between Guji and Gedeo in 2018, but the numbers are uncertain and potentially much higher, 
as the estimate is in fact somewhere between 24 and 97 deaths ("Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (Gedeo-Guji),"). Over the course of the year, nearly 1 million people fled their 
homes, and the entire community faced grave consequences in the form of lost lives, 
destruction of property, agriculture and lost resources overall (Mules, 11.08.2018).  
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1.1 Motivation 
When I first came across this conflict I was writing my proposal for the fieldwork exchange 
program with Dilla university, looking up suitable research topics in the country. It all started 
with a short rapport from the UN organization IOM (international organization from 
migration), which stated that near 1 million people were displaced in this conflict. I was quite 
frankly shocked by the number and the severity of the situation, but even more so by the fact 
that I had not heard anything about it. This was not too long after the Rohingya refugee crisis 
in Mayanmar, where nearly 800 000 people were displaced, that situation had received 
massive media attention (OCHA). I stay updated and follow the news regularly, and was 
extremely surprised that a displacement scenario possibly larger than the one in Myanmar had 
gone relatively unnoticed globally. And so my interest in the situation was peaked. 
Initially I had plans to study the internal displacement area of the conflict, but when I arrived 
in the field the situation had changed (as is often case, the information available online was 
already outdated at this point) and most of the displaced persons had been returned to their 
place of origin. That meant it would be much more difficult to study the displacement 
situation, with my limited means of access and transportation. Therefore I had to rethink my 
original plan.  
Ever since I had stumbled upon this conflict there was one thing that puzzled me, namely that 
I was not able to find out why this displacement scenario had taken place. The (limited) 
information online simple stated that it was an ethnic conflict or communal violence, but the 
information remained focused on the displacement situation. This gave me the impression that 
more research on the conflict itself was in-fact needed. Sure, there was research on the 1995 
and 1998 conflicts between the two groups, but no in-depth research appeared to have been 
conducted on the conflict of 2018. Later this was reinforced by my informants whom often 
stated that they didn’t know the real cause of the conflict. In other words my motivation 
changed to generate better understanding of the causes behind the displacement, namely the 
2018 conflict between the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups, where I identified a gap in available 
research at the time.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Conflict between ethnic groups in Ethiopia is nothing new, the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups 
respectively got into conflict both in 1995 and 1998. In fact, Ethiopia overall saw an increase 
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in intergroup conflicts in the 1990s, which have been linked to the implementation of the new 
system of ethnic federalism (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012, p. 2). The Guji and Gedeo conflict 
is one of several inter-group conflicts that erupted in Ethiopia in 2018, some researchers have 
tentatively linked this to the political changes that took place at the national level at the same 
time. (Yusuf, 2019, pp. 3, 7 ) 
Even so, there is a lack of in-depth research on the 2018 conflict, at least academically. Most 
research on the topic is years old, and therefore obviously focuses on the conflicts from the 
1990s. The newer events have yet to be considered in depth in academic research, and so the 
material available is mainly reports from humanitarian organizations and news articles related 
to the displacement scenario. An in-depth review of this existing literature will take place in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, further illustrating the gap in available research. 
When faced with an outbreak of conflict, we must ask “why did violent conflict break out 
between the Guji and the Gedeo in 2018?”. New research is needed into this new situation, to 
understand why it has come about and what really happened. It is especially peculiar, because 
the groups have been in conflict before. The fact that new conflict between the two groups 
suddenly broke out again in 2018, after 20 years of seemingly peaceful and stable relations, 
means more research is required to see if and/or how this new situation ties to the previous 
conflicts. This thesis suggest that is an indicator of recurring conflict, which is often caused 
by certain core issues remaining unresolved (S. Gates, H. v. M. Nygård, & E. Trappeniers, 
2016). Such unresolved issues can lay dormant for a long period of time. It is therefore 
necessary to consider not only the causes for the conflict, but also why this conflict broke out 
specifically in April 2018, hence what sparked the outbreak of violence.  
1.2.1 Research Objectives 
This study therefore aims to better understand why the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups in 
southern Ethiopia got into violent conflict again in 2018, after 20 years of relative stability. 
What the main causes of the conflict are, why the conflict took place at this specific time, and 
whether they relate to the 1995 and 1998 conflicts.  
1.2.2 Research Questions 
In order to meet the research objectives, as well as to answer the problems stated above, the 
research questions are as follows: 
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1) What are the core issues in the conflict between the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups? 
2) Why did conflict break out in April 2018 specifically?  
3) How does the 2018 conflict relate to the previous conflicts between the two groups? 
1.3 Scope of the Study 
This thesis does not aim to produce results that can be generalized, but simply to provide in-
dept insight into the conflict between Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups in southern Ethiopia, as 
the title of the project suggests. This is of course part of a larger national context that will be 
briefly touched upon, but this thesis does by no means aim to tackle the very present problem 
of intergroup conflict in Ethiopia. The study is a follow up on previous research on Guji-
Gedeo intergroup relations, in response to the new development in the situation. That will be 
elaborated upon in the literature review section of Chapter 3 of this thesis. Therefore the 
thesis aims to supplement the existing literature on the groups relationship, with a focus on 
the 2018 conflict.  
Timewise this study is limited to the period from 1991 to 2019. Starting in 1991 when the 
current government got into power, and the administrative system of today’s Ethiopia was 
drawn up. And ending in August 2019, which also marks the end of my fieldwork, and thus a 
natural ending point in the timeframe of this study. Any events taking place after this date will 
not be included in the data-collection for this thesis. It should be noted that the paper focuses 
primarily on the 2018 conflict. Setting the timeframe back to 1991, is mainly based on an 
assumption that one cannot leave the events of the 1990s out of the discussion, as the 2018 
events should be considered in connection to the previous conflicts between Guji and Gedeo. 
1.4 Relevance and Importance – Significance of the Study 
Explained in the simplest terms fieldwork started with a goal to find out what happened 
between Guji and Gedeo in 2018. Initially there was a lack of research, leaving several 
questions unanswered, as outlined in the sections 1.1 and 1.2 above. It should be noted that 
these events are relatively recent and, while unknown to me, there is a possibility that similar 
studies have or are taking place. However at the time the study was conducted there was a 
clear research-gap, that this thesis attempts to fill. 
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In short, intergroup conflicts have devastating effects on the societies in which they occur, 
they might even come to have a destabilizing effect on the entire nation or region if not 
managed properly. Violent inter-group conflicts have severe consequences, in the form of for 
example; loss of life, destruction of property, lost education, violence and trauma overall 
(Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009, p. 1). These grave consequences clearly underlines the 
relevance of such research in the field of peace studies. It is absolutely crucial to understand 
why such conflicts break out, after all one cannot hope to tackle the problems without in-
depth understanding of the causes and the context in which conflicts occur.  
The current lack of research clearly marks the research gap this thesis works within. On the 
basis of the 2018 eruption of conflict there is clearly a need for new research to account for 
these recent events. This study is largely a follow up on existing research on the inter-group 
relations between Guji and Gedeo, in light of the new events of 2018, as I have already stated. 
This thesis therefore aims to supply existing research on Guji and Gedeo relations, taking into 
consideration how this new eruption of violence links to the previous conflicts. Ultimately it 
is of importance to consider why the two groups keep getting into conflict, it is now the 3rd 
time since the restructuring of the country in 1991, and the ones suffering are the people 
inhabiting the two zones.  
As a side note, the research on the Guji and Gedeo conflicts this far has largely been executed 
by Ethiopian researchers (as will be illustrated in the literature review in chapter 2). Thus, 
while I might lack certain local understandings, my outlook is somewhat different and could 
therefore contribute something new to the topic overall. At the same time there are certain 
issues associated with researching as an outsider, the role of the researcher will be further 
elaborated upon in the methodological framework in Chapter 4.  
1.5 Outline of Thesis  
This thesis is made up of 7 chapters: 
First, Chapter 1 gives an introduction of the thesis topic, in the form of a problem statement, 
the objectives of the study and the research questions to be answered, as well as an account 
for the scope and relevance of the study itself.  
Chapter 2 follows up with a more detailed contextual background for the study. Incorporating 
brief historical and political accounts for the current national context in Ethiopia, as well as an 
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account of Guji-Gedeo intergroup relations the chapter is concluded by an account of the 
2018 conflict. 
Chapter 3 consists of a short review of existing literature on relevant topics, aiming to outline 
the findings of previous research. 
Chapter 4 is the methodological framework, which attempts to account for the methodology, 
methods and tools used in data-collection and analysis, concluded by an account of the role of 
the researcher and ethical considerations.  
In Chapter 5 a conceptual framework is outlined, of which will guide the following analysis. 
In particular the concepts of relevance violent conflict, communal conflict, conflict recurrence 
and ethnicity.  
In Chapter 6 the data will be analysed thematically, under the following themes: Land, 
Referendum, Grievances, Minority Rights, Elite Instigation, Ethnic Federalism, National 
Context and Ethnicity. 
Lastly, Chapter 7 makes for a brief conclusion. Here the key findings of the study are 
summarized, thus ensuring that the research objectives are met and the research questions 











Page 7 of 96 
Chapter 2 Context 
With the research questions from last chapter in mind, this chapter will provide the reader 
with some relevant background information, to better grasp the case of this study. Starting 
with a brief introduction to key events of Ethiopia’s history, followed by a description of 
Guji-Gedeo relations, and a short recaption of the 1995 and 1998 conflicts between the two 
groups. The last section consists of a brief account of the current national context, in which 
the 2018 conflict between Guji and Gedeo took place, and an outline of the 2018 conflict 
itself.   
2.1 Background 
Ethiopia has an extensive history, as one of the world’s oldest countries, and there is not 
enough space within the framework of this thesis to cover it entirely (Henze, 2001, p. 1).  This 
historical background makes up the foundation for the events of today, and one can hardly 
hope to understand any conflict without some understanding of the historical context in which 
it takes place.  
The Ethiopian State of today was consolidated during the 19th and 20th centuries. Through a 
combination of conquests and resistance towards the European states’ intensifying 
colonization in the region. Notably, Ethiopia is the only African country that, despite a few 
years under Italy during World War II, was not colonized. Ethiopia beat the Italians in battle 
twice in 1896 and 1935, and thus has a distinctly different history compared to most other 
African states, which were colonized (Mehretu & Crummey, 2019).  
In the last half of the 20th century, Ethiopia went through major changes. The last Ethiopian 
emperor – Haile Selassie – ended his rule in 1974, when the military staged a coup and a 
socialist dictatorship (DERG1) was established. The DERG regime supressed ethnic identities 
and implemented radical land reforms, in coordination with the Marxist ideology (Mehretu & 
Crummey, 2019). The current Ethiopian state structure can be traced back to the end of the 
DERG regime in 1991. This brought the coalition Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) to power – which they have held since (Temesgen, 2015, p. 52) 
 
1 Also spelled Dergue, means “committee” in Amharic (language of the Amhara ethnic group), it was the name 
of the socialist military dictatorship that ruled Ethiopia in this period (Clapham, 2004, p. 73).  
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Following the regime change, the EPRDF took a different approach compared to previous 
governments. Most important for this thesis, they implemented the administrative system of 
Ethnic Federalism, which we will return to shortly (Temesgen, 2015, p. 50). 
2.1.1 Ethnicity in Ethiopia – the Nationalities Question 
Today Ethiopia is made up of more than 80 recognized ethnic groups (Temesgen, 2015, pp. 1-
2). It is argued that the empires conquests in the beginning of the 20th century created an 
“asymmetrical power relationship” between the ethnic groups in the south and the Amhara 
and Tigrayan ethnic groups in the north (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012, pp. 1-2). The southern 
groups were subject to long-lasting exploitation and “denied access to political power, 
economic resources, and cultural autonomy” (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012, p. 2). 
In the 1960s the “nationalities question”2 rose. It manifested in ethnic-based movements 
opposing the longstanding order of suppression of certain ethnic groups, seeking ethnic and 
cultural recognition, as well as self-determination (Halabo, 2019, p. 17). This history lays the 
fundament for the role ethnicity plays in the Ethiopian society today, from this point in time 
ethnicity became an aspect in the political movements (politicized ethnicity)(Halabo, 2019, 
pp. 17-18). However, it was only with the EPRDFs rise to power in 1991 that this issue of the 
ethnic groups was formally addressed, with the Ethnic Federalism they sought to govern the 
country through recognition of the ethnic groups (Aalen, 2006, pp. 245-246).  
2.2 Ethnic Federalism  
The EPRDF completely restructured the country, administratively, politically, and 
economically, after they gained power in 1991. In the EPRDFs Ethiopian constitution from 
1994, it was outlined that the country would be organized after a system of Ethnic Federalism. 
Federalism as a concept refers to sharing of power between several relatively autonomous 
units, often to uphold the primary ideals of shared rule and self-rule. (Abbink, 2006, pp. 392-
395) In the Ethiopian context that means power is divided between the national government 
and nine recognized regional states, in addition to two city administrations (see appendix 1), 
 
2 The “inequalities in power, cultural prestige and resources between the various ethno-linguistic groups” in the 
country (Abbink, 2006, p. 390). 
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as listed in Article 47 of the constitution (Constitution of The Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, 1994). 
Several countries in the world are organized after forms of federalism, with varying success 
(Temesgen, 2015, p. 50). What is unique with the Ethiopian form of government is that the 
federalist structure is based on ethnicity. In other words, the administrative units are created 
on the basis of ethnic groups, identified through linguistic and cultural criteria (Tefari, 2012, 
p. 64). And so, with the introduction of Ethnic Federalism, ethnicity officially became a 
dominant aspect in the country’s structure of administration, as well as within the political 
sphere. It is therefore essential to have a relative understanding of the Ethnic Federalism if 
one hopes to understand any political phenomenon in Ethiopia today (Abbink, 2011, p. 597). 
To provide some more detail on the country’s administrative structure, the regions separated 
into lower administrative units (zones), once again on the basis of ethnicity. Of relevance to 
this thesis are: The Oromia Region, which the West-Guji zone is part of, and the Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region which encompasses the Gedeo zone. At a lower 
level the zones are separated into smaller districts, called Woredas (See map of West-Guji and 
Gedeo in Appendix 2). The lowest level of administration are the Kebeles, which can be small 
villages or neighbourhoods (Temesgen, 2015, p. 50). 
Since it was implemented in the beginning of the 1990s, Ethnic Federalism has been subject 
to much debate, in and outside of Ethiopia. The Ethnic Federalism was expected to reduce 
ethnic conflict through the emphasis on self-rule and to avoid the dominance of certain ethnic 
groups, as well as to hinder disintegration of the entire country due to ethnic opposition, 
through the recognition of ethnic identities (Abbink, 2006, pp. 395-396; 2011, pp. 597, 605). 
It also marked the introduction of democracy in Ethiopia, which was seen as a major 
development at the time (Abbink, 2006, p. 598). 
In the end, this thesis does not aim to evaluate ethnic federalism, but the reader might note 
that statistics do suggest that localized inter-group conflict has increased in Ethiopia after 
1991, and that research has linked this development to the implementation of the Ethnic 
Federalism (Aalen, 2006). Much more could be said about ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, it is 
a complex system to say the least. We will explore this further in the literature review 
(Chapter 3) and in the analysis (Chapter 6), to see how the Guji-Gedeo conflict fits into this 
structural framework.  
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2.2.1 Land and border under Ethnic Federalism 
It is also necessary to mention the issue of land under the Ethnic Federalism, to illustrate how 
the system affected the relationship between the Guji and Gedeo neighbouring ethnic groups 
directly in the early 1990s. Previously, under the emperors, a longstanding feudal system of 
land ownership was in place (Haddis, 2016, p. 2). Then the 1975 land reform nationalized all 
land, making all the land state owned. Under this system rights of land use are distributed to 
farmers (Lavers, 2018, p. 463). The Ethiopian constitution’s article 40 states that all citizens 
(peasants) have the right to obtain land (Constitution of The Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, 1994). 
This system of nationalized land ownership is rather contradictory to the 1994 Ethiopian 
constitutions understanding of ethnic groups as groups with defined territories. With the 
implementation of the ethnic federalism in 1991, a process began to draw borders between 
different ethnic groups, to form the ethnic based administrative units, and hence it was 
necessary to determine which groups the land “belonged” to. In the case of Guji and Gedeo, 
this was made increasingly complicated both by the groups’ close relationship and by 
previous resettling schemes that in reality had changed who lived on the land.  
These resettling schemes were directed by the government throughout the 20th century, for 
various purposes. First the argument was that the government would benefit from the farming 
of coffee that the Gedeo practiced, rather than from the Guji’s traditional livestock herding. It 
was only as a consequence of the 1960 Gedeo uprising3 one saw larger scale resettling 
schemes directed by the government. Here Gedeo households were resettled into Guji areas, 
as “a means of controlling both groups and weakening the uprising” (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 
2012, p. 14). Then again in the 1980s, under the DERG regime, another round of resettling 
took place. This time the purpose was in fact related to the high population density in Gedeo, 
but also part of the regimes strategy to weaken “ethnic-based movements by mixing groups” 
(Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012, pp. 13-14). This has complicated the issue of land and who has 
rights to the land in the area, combined with the ethnic federalism and the creation of the 
 
3 A protest against the feudal system, that was in place in the area, at that time (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012, pp. 
13-14). 
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administrative zones this makes up an important context for the later conflicts between Guji 
and Gedeo.  
2.3 The Guji and Gedeo Ethnic groups 
Guji and Gedeo are neighbouring ethnic groups, situated in the southern part of Ethiopia. The 
two groups have a long history together, and share an understanding of common mythical 
ancestry,4 referring to each other as brothers and sisters (Kinfemichael, 2014, p. 75) 
Traditionally, the Guji are primarily pastoralists, and the Gedeo are mainly farmers. As 
neighbouring groups, they inhabits parts of the same territory, and research finds that the two 
groups have experienced conflict over resources prior to 1991 (Kinfemichael, 2014, pp. 77, 
88-89). But mostly (and in contrast to other groups in the area), previous studies suggest that 
their lifestyles were quite complementary. Evidence suggests that the two groups had 
relatively good relations, with prominent trade-dependency and intermarriages. Any conflicts 
were usually resolved through local indigenous traditions of conflict resolution (Asebe 
Debelo Regassa, 2007, pp. 37, 53). 
Culturally the Guji are part of the traditional indigenous Gadaa system5 of the Oromo ethnic 
groups6. The complex Gadaa system deals with the political, social and economic areas of 
Oromo communal life (Boru, 2016, p. 66). The Gedeo are organized under the Baallee 
system7, which guides life in a very similar way (Kinfemichael, 2014, p. 74). Both systems 
are present throughout all of life, from birth to death, and still hold a strong positions in Guji 
and Gedeo societies8 (Kinfemichael, 2014, pp. 72-74). Hence, no cultural or social 
phenomena could be understood without mentioning them. In the end, these systems, as well 
 
4 According to the myth Guji and Gedeo are brothers from the same father, Gedeo is the older brother and Guji 
the younger (Interview 36). 
5 Democratic system of governance of the Oromo ethnic groups (Boru, 2016) 
6 Oromo makes up the biggest ethnic group in Ethiopia, situated in the south of the country (Boru, 2016; 
Kinfemichael, 2014). 
7 The Baallee system incorporates large parts of the Gaddaa system. While the Gedeo are not part of the Oromo 
ethnic groups, it is said that they inherited the system from their Guji neighbors, and it is an indicator of their 
strong historical relationship (Boru, 2016). 
8 The Gaddaa system was abolished by the government in the past, as part of the suppression of the ethnic 
groups. Among the Guji the system still holds a strong position today, while its role has declined among many 
other groups. (Kinfemichael, 2014, pp. 71-72) 
 
Page 12 of 96 
as the cultures of Guji and Gedeo, are much more complex than this thesis has the space to 
cover9.  
There is one other aspect of high relevant for the Guji-Gedeo inter-group relations: the 
Gondoro ritual. The Gondoro, which is a part of the Gadaa system, is a ritual used to settle 
more serious disputes (such as homicide) within and between Guji and Gedeo10 (Boru, 2016, 
p. 66). In the local languages Gondoro means for something “not to happen again” (Interview 
10). As brothers with common ancestry the two groups have an understanding that they 
should not kill each other. A myth exists among the groups that if Guji or Gedeo kill each 
other a curse will be placed upon the killer and his family, the groups strongly believe that the 
curse brings sickness like paralysis, leprosy, and other “misfortunes in life and death” 
(Kinfemichael, 2014, pp. 75, 88-89). The Gondoro ritual, led by elders from the two groups, 
is what lifts the curse; in other words it works as a mechanism of conflict resolution among 
the two groups (Boru, 2016, p. 65). The importance of the Gondoro becomes apparent in the 
next section.  
2.3.1 1995 and 1998 conflicts 
Despite their historically good relations the two groups got into violent conflict both in 1995 
and in 1998. These conflicts were of a different character than any previous smaller disputes 
over resources between the two groups (Kinfemichael, 2014, p. 77). After implementation of 
the ethnic federalist system, Gedeo became a zone under the Southern Nations and 
Nationalities Peoples region (SNNP), and Guji became part of the Oromia region (see 
Appendix 1 for map), in other words they are separated by a zonal and a regional border 
(Kinfemichael, 2014, p. 62).  
 
Initially, the Guji were separated between the Gedeo zone and the Borana zone11, causing 
great discontent among the Guji, as they allegedly became “minorities on their own land” and 
 
9 The reader may consult the following literature for more information on the topic: (UNESCO, 2016) (Jalata, 
2012) (Desalegn, 2019) (Boru, 2016) (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012) (Kinfemichael, 2014).  
10 Also used by other Oromo tribes (Boru, 2016; Kinfemichael, 2014)  
11 Borana is part of the Oromia region. Guji later separated from Borana all together, and became the separate 
zones west-Guji and east-Guji (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012) 
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therefore lacked “self-rule” as a minority group in both zones (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012, 
p. 18). Consequently, a wish for the Guji in the Gedeo zone to reintegrate with the Guji in the 
Borana zone emerged. In the process of implementing the 1994 constitution, several 
referendums were held across the country to determine where administrative borders should 
be drawn in cases where conflicting claims over territory were raised. The idea was that this 
would give the inhabitants of the disputed area the opportunity to decide which region the 
area should belong to12. But in reality the process did not go smoothly (Kinfemichael, 2014, 
pp. 78-79). The case of Guji and Gedeo is one instance in which the dispute ended in 
violence.   
 
The Guji hoping to reintegrate into the Oromia region, within the same zone as the rest of the 
Guji population, brought the issue up to the national government, which resulted in a 
referendum of the kind outlined above. The referendum was based on a bare majority vote 
(50%+1), complicated by resettling plans executed by the previous governments that had 
supposedly changed the population ratio in certain areas. It has later been argued that this 
form of referendum favoured the Gedeo (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012, p. 22). 
 
And so, in spring 1995 conflict broke out among the Guji and Gedeo over dissatisfaction with 
the ongoing referendum on where the border between Gedeo and Borana should be drawn. 
The Uppsala conflict database states that the fighting caused the death of around 1000 people, 
as well as destruction of property and displacement of over 60 000. Violence ended when 
federal police troops intervened ("Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Gedeo-Guji),"). 
In 1998 politicians from the both zones pushed for another referendum to settle the territorial 
dispute once and for all. Critically, the referendum was opposed by the general population at 
the time. In turn, this increased tensions among the two groups once again, and at the July 
 
12 To manage conflict, the most relevant institution under the current system is the House of Federation [HoF], 
which is ‘composed of representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’. Article 48 in the Ethiopian 
constitution lists the procedures that the HoF should follow when border disputes arise between the regional 
states, when the states themselves are unable to reach an agreement. Under Article 48 the HoF should give a 
final decision within two years. If negotiation between the involved parties fails the solution has usually been to 
hold a referendum, for the people themselves to decide (Constitution of The Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, 1994). 
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conference in Bule Hora town (at the time called Hagere Mariam) tensions exploded into 
violence (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012, p. 23). The Uppsala conflict database estimates that 
over a few days more than 700 people were killed. This time the national police was unable to 
contain the situation. Eventually elders from both groups, as well as from neighbouring ethnic 
groups, intervened in the situation and were able to end the violence through Gondoro13 
("Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Gedeo-Guji),"). It is here worth noting that according to 
the Uppsala conflict database neither conflicts have been «terminated». In fact none of the 
referendums were completed, due to the outbreak of conflict (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012, p. 
25). The causes of these conflicts will be further discussed in the literature review.  
2.4 Ethiopia, 2018 
The year 2018 brought major political changes to the state of Ethiopia. In April 2018 a new 
prime minister – Dr. Abiy Ahmed, also from EPRDF – was elected, following a crisis within 
the government. Protests towards the government had been ongoing since 2014, culminating 
in the unexpected resignation of the former Prime minister – Hailemariam Desalegn – in 
February 2018. Prime minister Abiy has since pushed for a number of reforms, most relevant 
are the return of exiled political opposition, the opening of blocked webpages and TV 
channels, and the ceasing of disputed territory to Eritrea ("Abiy Ahmed: Ethiopia's prime 
minister,"). Ethiopia was, in other words, going through a liberation process, which has been 
celebrated both nationally and internationally. Although critics argued that it was too much 
too soon (T.  Gardner, 2019). The main concern among experts seemed to be that the sudden 
opening of political space might cause instability and lead to the eruption of formerly 
repressed inter-group conflicts, an issue we will return to shortly ("Abiy Ahmed: Ethiopia's 
prime minister,"). 
Alongside this political liberation process, Ethiopia was the country in which most people got 
displaced in 2018, which also gained international attention. The Displacement Tracking 
Matrix (DTM) estimated that there was over 2.2 million IDPs in Ethiopia as of February 
2019. This number had steadily increased over the last few years, but raised sharply 
 
13 The Gondoro was not executed after the 1995 conflict, so this was the first time the government recognized 
the importance of these traditional institutions in conflict management.  
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throughout 2018. The most significant cause for displacement in the country, according to the 
DTM, was inter-group conflicts (DTM, 2019a). 
At the same time, Ethiopia has increasingly faced displacement due to climate disasters, 
which is estimated to have displaced 508,723 persons in the same period (DTM, 2019a). The 
country is increasingly affected by climate change, in the form of both floods and drought. 
This not only displaces people, but consequently put increasing strain on already limited 
resources – which some researchers argue could contribute to conflict (Yishak, 2019). Along 
the same lines one might also note that Ethiopia also ranked 9th among countries with most 
refugees in 2018, most originating from the neighbouring countries in the otherwise unstable 
region. Factors like disasters, conflict, displacement and masses of refugees all put increasing 
strain on the country´s already struggling economy (Jeffrey, 2019). In the last few years 
Ethiopia has faced rising unemployment, and high inflation has caused a decrease in living 
standards and widespread poverty. Such factors are in turn argued to create conditions more 
favourable for conflict, and while not directly related to this study, the reader should take note 
of the overall context in which the Guji-Gedeo conflict takes place (Yusuf, 2019, p. 10). 
2.5 The 2018 Guji-Gedeo Conflict  
Looking closely at the conflict induced internal displacements in 2018, nearly one million 
people were displaced in one conflict only (DTM, 2019b). The Guji-Gedeo conflict was in 
other words responsible for nearly half of the internally displaced persons in Ethiopia in 2018. 
Making this conflict in itself the number one cause of internal displacement in Ethiopia that 
year, which underlines the severity of the situation and the need for more research on the 
conflict itself. 
Information regarding the conflict is rather limited, both with regards to what happened and 
the causes behind these events. What we do know is mostly based on reports from 
humanitarian organizations and news articles, hence there is an apparent lack of academic 
research on the situation. Data from my time in the field will therefore supply this section, 
where I could not find information elsewhere. Here we will talk briefly about the conflict and 
what actually happened in 2018 (and 2019) – without touching too much on the causes, as 
they will be discussed in the following literature review and in the analysis.  
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My data suggests that violence first broke out in Kercha Woreda in West-Guji, in April of 
2018, and then spread to other areas (Interview 8). Yarnell writes in a field report for 
Refugees International in November 2018 that the “precise trigger of the violence remains 
unclear”, which is precisely the gap this thesis attempts to fill. What we do know about the 
character of the violence is that “armed mobs and youth groups attacked villages, forcing 
people to flee their homes” (Yarnell, 2018). Other articles and reports have characterised it as 
communal violence – in which people were targeted and displaced on the basis of their 
ethnicity (T. Gardner, 2019). At the time of conflict, the violence was intense; houses, crops, 
and property were destroyed to prevent people from returning. And there were frequent 
reports of killings, rape, and other crimes (Interview 10, 21 & 34).  
It appears that violence broke out between the groups in April of 2018, after two decades of 
relative stability, forcing “around 300 000 people to flee their homes” (Yarnell, 2018). At the 
time “government authorities made some arrests after a brief investigation and declared the 
situation resolved, leaving people to begin returning home. A few months later, in June, 
violence erupted once again on an even more intense scale. Over 800,000 people were forced 
to flee” (Yarnell, 2018). According to my own data there was a third round of displacement in 
March 2019 (Interview 22).  
Like Yarnell suggests above the rounds of displacement were linked to the government’s 
premature attempt to settle the conflict, which led people to return to their homes, only to be 
displaced again (T. Gardner, 2019). The government was also involved in the execution of the 
Gondoro ritual in an attempt to settle the conflict. The Gondoro was executed twice during the 
conflict, as the first attempt was unsuccessful, it was argued that the attempt had been 
premature and that the ritual lost legitimacy when the government (rather than the Gaadda 
leaders) ordered it (Interview 10).  
The displaced persons could be split into three groups: Gedeo displaced from West-Guji, Guji 
displaced from Gedeo, and people displaced within the zones (Interview 22). In other words, 
violence and displacement took place in both zones and among both groups. During 
displacement, a majority of the IDPs lived with local communities, while others lived “in ad 
hoc collective centers, such as schools, disused or unfinished buildings” (Schlein, 2018). 
These collective sites were reported to be “extremely overcrowded”, sanitary conditions were 
often poor, and food, water, and shelter was limited (Schlein, 2018). Evidently the situation 
was greatly challenging both for the displaced persons and for the host-communities, who 
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shared their resources to support the IDPs (Interview 25). The dire humanitarian situation is 
outside the scope of this thesis, but the severe consequences of this conflict should be noted. 
2.5.1 The Qeerroo 
During my time in the field, in the summer of 2019, the government was in the process of 
returning the IDPs to their places of origin as the conflict had officially ended. But in reality 
some areas were still facing violence and instability. According to my informants this was 
because of “the Qeerroo”. These groups have many names, “Qeerroo” is the local name, but 
my informants also referred to them as local militias, rebel groups, guerrilla groups or 
“unidentified arms groups” (Interview 2, 22 & 34). And they are groups of young men, who 
arguably were responsible for much of the violence in the 2018 conflict. 
The Qeerroo is said to have been engaged in the protest towards the previous government in 
the past (Schemm, 2018). A Washington Post article mentions this, arguing that the groups 
have certain grievances with the government and the local administration in particular, “the 
Qeerroo feel that the local administration remains corrupt and unresponsive and that the 
central government is not addressing their economic demands” (Schemm, 2018). And these 
grievances appear to remain even after the change in government and the reforms 
implemented by the new prime minister. During the time of the conflict it was argued that 
these groups, in some areas, controlled the local government and acted as a form of “self-
appointed police force” in the process of displacing people from the other ethnic group 
(Schemm, 2018). Multiple informants also suggested that these groups were affiliated with 
the OLF14, though to what extent remains unknown. 
When Yarnell in the previous section mentioned “armed mobs and youth groups” that 
“attacked villages, forcing people to flee their homes” he was likely referring to the Qeerroo 
(Yarnell, 2018). These groups of young men were responsible for much of the violence and 
displacement that characterized the 2018 conflict, though the character of the violence 
differed from place to place.. Throughout fieldwork I came across a number of accounts of 
 
14 The Oromo Liberation (OLF) front is a political party from the Oromia region, working for the “right to 
national self-determination” for the Oromo people. The group has engaged in armed attacks in the past, and has 
been labeled as a terrorist group by the government ("Thousands of Ethiopians hail return of once-banned 
Oromo group," 2018). 
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these groups, in particular from people who had been or were still displaced. For example, I 
spoke to a group of displaced persons in Dilla town in late August of 2019, at that time where 
all IDPs (officially) had been returned to their places of origin. These people, who were from 
Kercha woreda, did not feel it was safe to return there. They expressed fear of the Qeerroo 
who the claimed continued terrorizing people in the area (Interview 34). 
On the basis of my own data, the Qeerroo continued violence in certain areas after the 
Gondoro was executed and the conflict had officially ended (Interview 2, 22 & 34). It is worth 
noting that around that time the government was getting engaged in the fight against these 
groups, putting in some efforts to stabilize the situation and prosecute the perpetrators 
(Interview 12, 20 & 35).  
In the end, it is clearly within the context outlined in this chapter that the recent situation in 
the Guji and Gedeo zones must be analysed. This chapter has given a brief introduction into 
the historical background and context of Ethiopia overall, as well as the relationship between 
Guji and Gedeo more specifically. Some of these points will be elaborated upon in the 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
As the research questions suggest this thesis aims to shed light on the 2018 conflict, and in 
particular the causes of said conflict. In this chapter I present the findings of previous 
research, to get an overview of the academic literature on the topic. This chapter considers the 
causes identified in the 1995 and 1998 conflicts between the two groups, then the last part of 
the chapter will consider the available literature specifically on the 2018 conflict.  
3.1 The 1995 &1998 Conflicts 
Much research can be found on inter-group conflicts in Ethiopia, as the issue has been 
prominent for decades. These conflicts are often categorized as “ethnic conflicts”, a label that 
some researchers have attributed to the conflicts between Guji and Gedeo as well (Conflict 
Barometer 2018, p. 22; Dagne, 2013; Yusuf, 2019). While it is indeed a conflict between two 
ethnic groups, it might be simplistic to label ethnicity a main cause. Lubo Tefari argues that in 
reality “these conflicts considered as inter-ethnic in the Horn of Africa are driven by 
multifarious complex interrelated variables, rather than pure ethnic hatred and antagonism.” 
(Tefari, 2012, p. 63). Many studies have raised similar claims, arguing that local border and 
territory conflicts in Ethiopia have often been incorrectly generalized as “ethnic” conflicts, 
while in reality the conflicts are much more complex (Abbink, 2011; Asebe Debelo Regassa, 
2012).  
That is one critique this thesis addresses, as my findings have no indications that ethnicity and 
ethnic differences is a major factor in the Guji-Gedeo conflict. The claim that ethnicity in 
itself is not the core issue is well supported by the understanding of common ancestry and 
intermarriage among the two groups. In addition, the groups still consider each other brothers 
and sisters, and share many rituals under the Gaddaa system. The thesis returns to this issue in 
the conceptual framework. 
Rather than ethnic differences, researchers have identified a number of other factors as causes 
for the 1995 and 1998 conflicts. On one hand some researchers have raised the argument that 
a main cause was in fact competition over resources (Hussein, 2002; Tefari, 2012). This 
notion has been criticized by other researchers, on the grounds that writing the Guji and 
Gedeo conflict off as traditional resource competition is far too simple (Dagne, 2013; Asebe 
Debelo Regassa, 2007, 2012). In reality, both conflicts were much more severe than any 
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former dispute over resources had been, simply illustrated by the number of deaths and 
displacements that occurred. Research suggests the conflicts were rather over political, social 
and cultural issues, as will be further outlined in the rest of this section.  
Other than that, the academic literature is largely in agreement on the factors leading to and 
the causes behind the 1995 and 1998 conflicts. First of all, research suggest that traditional 
resource conflict between the two groups, while it existed in the past, became a border 
conflict with the implementation of the Ethnic Federalist system in the 1990s (Kinfemichael, 
2014, p. 63). That is the analysis of Girum Kinfemichael, an Ethiopian researcher, who 
studied the Guji-Gedeo conflicts with a focus on conflict resolution. 
Shibru Abate Dagne concludes in his PhD thesis from Andhra University that “despite the 
underlying assumption by many that ethnic federalism will improve relations among ethnic 
groups of the country and lessen conflicts, the formation of ethnic federal arrangements 
brought about violent conflicts among the long-time friendly (‘brotherly’) peoples of the 
Gedeo and the Guji” (Dagne, 2013, p. 281). In other words, there is an argued link between 
the ethnic federalism and the Guji-Gedeo conflicts. The thesis will return to this shortly. 
Kinfemichaels and Dagne’s arguments above is largely complementary to the main findings 
of the Ethiopian researcher Asebe Regassa Debelo (2007), who studied the Guji and Gedeo 
ethnic groups and their relationship extensively. In his study of the conflicts Regassa creates a 
complex picture of the changing relations between Guji-Gedeo in the early 1990s. Shortly 
explained, he attributes the causes for conflict partially to territorial integrity and self-rule, 
and partially to contention of the border issue. Throughout his work he too states that the 
Guji-Gedeo did co-exist peacefully and complementary to one another, despite their 
differences. But the ethnic federalist system, that was introduced in the early 1990s, launched 
the issues of territory and self-rule, which made the placement of the border a factor for 
conflict. (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2007, pp. 73, 96-97, 100-103) Regassa’s findings are 
supported by most following studies on the Guji and Gedeo conflicts, such as the ones by 
Dagne and Kinfemichael.  
In a newer article, Regassa states that the Guji-Gedeo conflicts of the 1990s were “essentially 
over sorting out the rights each group was constitutionally granted in the new political 
dispensation in Ethiopia” (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2012, p. 2). Here he enters into a debate 
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that has dominated studies of inter-group conflict in Ethiopia since the early 1990s, namely 
the role of ethnic federalism in emerging inter-group conflicts.  
3.1.1 Ethnic Federalism 
Seeing that several researchers links the previous conflicts to the implementation of the ethnic 
federalism, as a point of change in the relationship between Guji and Gedeo, it seems 
necessary to consider what research suggest the issues with ethnic federalism are. The chapter 
will focus on critique that is relevant for the Guji-Gedeo context. We introduced the system of 
ethnic federalism briefly in the background. In academia there has been debate about its role 
in intergroup conflicts in Ethiopia over the last three decades or so. Increasing critiques 
towards the “project” have emerged, and multiple researchers have argued that there are 
fundamental flaws both with the system itself and in the way it is implemented across 
Ethiopia, that might directly or indirectly cause conflict.  
Under this new system, as the argument goes, the emphasis placed upon ethnic identity 
overrides other long-standing aspects of identity, such as religion and citizenship, which 
previously worked as bridges, helping to moderate and limit conflict (Temesgen, 2015, pp. 
49, 51). Ethnicity has become the basis for recognition and power, and consequently 
differences between groups are emphasised. The groups’ distinctiveness is of importance 
rather than coexistence and similarities (e.g. religion, common history etc). This altogether, 
create an environment in which ethnic groups are in competition with each other, and those 
are favourable conditions for conflict in themselves. 
First of all, with the implementation of ethnic federalism, ethnicity has become the primary 
basis for mass-mobilization in Ethiopia. It is argued that Ethnic Federalism created “an 
incentive” for actors to strengthen ethnic differences and increasingly “mobilize on ethnic 
grounds” (Aalen, 2011, p. 180). In other words, “…the politicization of ethnic identity as the 
primary vehicle for claims and entitlements to economic resources and political power” 
(Tefari, 2012). Under ethnic federalism, ethnicity is directly linked with access to resources, 
politics, and power, which has caused concern among some researchers, who argue that 
“mistrust and hatred among ethnic groups grow out of the EPRDF's theory of governance” 
(Taye, 2017, p. 53). 
Second, there is critique of the “territorializing of ethnicity” that comes with ethnic 
federalism. (Tefari, 2012, pp. 3, 5) The 1994 Ethiopian Constitution understand ethnic groups 
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as groups with defined territories, and hence a group’s territory is closely tied to recognition 
and the group’s rights (Constitution of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1994). 
In the past ethnic groups could “share” the same land. With Ethnic Federalism physical 
administrative borders were drawn on an ethnic basis, and one group became the ethnic 
majority in that area. In reality the ethnic majority has monopoly on the official culture in that 
zone, for example with regards to the language of education (Kinfemichael, 2014, p. 67). This 
way the zones become “mono-ethnic”. But in reality all people from a group do not live 
within the administrative borders of that group’s territory.  
A main aspect of the ethnic federal system was the promised recognition of ethnic groups, and 
the right for these groups to develop their own culture, which many were lacking before 1991. 
In reality though, research has found that the minority issue remains (Abbink, 2006, 2011). In 
fact, there is an apparent lack of minority rights protection within the new system, for 
example access to resources and opportunities overall is granted to those who live within their 
“designated ethnic homelands” (Kinfemichael, 2014, p. 67). For people who live outside of 
their group’s designated area, or for groups who are minorities in their zone, such rights are 
not guaranteed. And critics argue there is a high risk of discrimination of minority ethnic 
groups due to the structure of the ethnic federalism. (Temesgen, 2015, p. 51) (Kinfemichael, 
2014, pp. 67-68) (Abbink, 2006, 2011) This is evident in the Guji-Gedeo case. Previously 
they co-inhabited a large area, after the administrative border was drawn there are now large 
minorities in both zones.  
With the lack of minority rights under the ethnic federalism, conflicts over territorial 
demarcation between administrative units have appeared. Abbink argues that an effect of the 
restructuring of the country is that territories have become “mono-ethnic”, meaning that they 
can no longer be shared between multiple groups, as the “sovereignty” of the unit remains 
with the majority group. (Abbink, 2011, p. 604) Along these lines it has been a main concern 
among researchers that the ethnic federalism does not manage conflicts, rather it appears to 
pit groups against each other, as supposedly have been the case for the Guji and Gedeo.  
Lastly, research has criticized how ethnicity under the ethnic federalism is used as a tool for 
mobilization and control by elites both at a federal and local level, with the aims to oppress 
the population, as well as for their own political and economic gains (Dagne, 2013, pp. 280-
282; Kinfemichael, 2014, p. 65). In the Guji-Gedeo conflicts too, it is argued that the Ethnic 
Federalism permits local elites to use the system for their own gain, failing to uphold the ideal 
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of self-rule, and allowing for discrimination of minorities as already discussed (Kinfemichael, 
2014, pp. 403-404).  
Research on the 1995 &1998 conflict found that elite actors played a decisive role in the 
outbreak of violent conflict, for example evident in the way they pushed for a new referendum 
in 1998 – against the wishes of the general population. Overall, the Guji and Gedeo 
population opposed the 1998 referendum, expressing wishes to co-exist peacefully. The local 
governments were the ones who pushed the referendum forward, this way instigating renewed 
conflict, as part of their own “political game” (Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2007, pp. 81-82). 
Regassa hence argues that while the 1990s conflicts were over territorial integrity and self-
rule, the elites were the ones driving the referendums that sparked the violent conflicts (Asebe 
Debelo Regassa, 2007, pp. 100-103). This study too finds that the structure of the ethnic 
federalism plays a role in the 2018 conflict, this will be discussed in detail in the analysis.  
3.1.2 Resolution of the Conflicts 
There is a saying that “the seeds of war often is sowed during war” – in other words how 
conflicts come to an end are often relevant for the outbreak of conflicts in the future (Scott 
Gates et al., 2016, p. 1). This thesis argues end of the previous conflicts are of relevance for 
the 2018 conflict, hence we will briefly consider this aspect. With regards to the Guji-Gedeo 
conflict, there is some disagreement among researchers on the outcome of the previous 
conflicts. 
On the one hand Regassa writes is his 2012 article that “the Guji-Gedeo case can be cited as 
a positive story that highlights the efficacy of the indigenous system in building sustaining 
peace,” referring primarily to the Gondoro executed after the 1998 conflict (Asebe Debelo 
Regassa, 2012, p. 25). While it is difficult to predict the future, this seem increasingly 
doubtful after the outbreak of conflict between the two groups in 2018. An examination of the 
2018 conflict is needed to establish whether it is linked to the conflict issues from the 90s. If 
so one can hardly claim that the resolution was successful. On the other hand Kinfemichael 
(2014) more cautiously argues that “given the unresolved dispute over the contested borders 
of the Guji and Gedeo peoples, one could not rule out the possibility of conflict again in those 
localities” (Kinfemichael, 2014, p. 92).  
This thesis strongly sides with those arguing that the conflicts were not properly settled and 
attempts to show precisely how the 2018 conflict is linked to the previous two conflicts. this 
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study argues that the 1995 and 1998 conflicts in themselves play a direct role in the 2018 
conflict, which will become increasingly apparent in the Analysis Chapter. As a last point, 
existing research is in strong agreement that the local institutions, and the Gondoro in 
particular, must be recognized and supported to achieve sustainable peace between the Guji 
and Gedeo ethnic groups (Dagne, 2013; Kinfemichael, 2014; Asebe Debelo Regassa, 2007, 
2012). A notion this study is in full agreement with. 
3.2 The 2018 Conflict 
There is a lack of research on the more recent events that have taken place between Guji and 
Gedeo, most academic research dates back years, and thus focus on the events of the 1990s. 
The information that does exist largely consists of accounts and reports created by various 
humanitarian organizations and news agencies, and they focus primarily on the following 
displacement situation, not the conflict itself.  
For example, the Human Rights Watch writes in a report of Prime Minister Abiy’s first year 
in office that “Guji aggression against Gedeo forced thousands of people, mainly Gedeo, to 
flee their homes…” ("Ethiopia: Abiy’s First Year as Prime Minister, Review of Conflict and 
Internally Displaced Persons," 2019) While such events took place, this statement is 
somewhat simplistic, not taking into account why these events took place, nor what the causes 
of conflict were. It also appears to place blame on one side only, while displacement in reality 
took place amongst both groups. In such statements the lack of available research becomes a 
problem.  
Tom Gardner, who did extensive journalist work in the area, summed the situation up this 
way: “The conflict looked, on the surface, like a Malthusian eruption – in which population 
outstrips food supply. Gedeos and Guji Oromos share some of the country’s most densely 
populated farmland, and both groups are fast growing in number. But gruesome reports of 
lynchings, rapes and beheadings, and of complicity among local officials, police and militia, 
makes it seem more like organised ethnic cleansing than an ordinary tribal clash.” (T.  
Gardner, 2019) He, in other words, touches upon population growth and ethnicity as key 
issues. This thesis, as mentioned, does not find ethnicity to be a key cause of the conflict. 
However, Gardners observation of violence towards people on the basis of their ethnicity will 
be considered in the analysis. The Human Rights Watch and Gardner talks more about the 
nature of the conflict, and do not consider the causes behind these scenarios.  
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In the available material on the Guji-Gedeo 2018 conflict some possible causes are suggested, 
for example, several articles suggest that the conflict is related to land and resources. An 
article from Reuters suggests that “the fighting is one of several ethnic conflicts fuelled by 
grievances over land in Ethiopia, Africa's second largest country by population” (Obulutsa, 
2018). Along the same lines, another news article from VOA states that “disputes over 
borders and the allocation of pasture and water resources have long been a source of tension 
between people in Gedeo and West Guji” (Schlein, 2018). This thesis, similarly to arguments 
raised by researchers studying the previous conflicts, urges that this explanation is far too 
simple. The news article from VOA does however also mention the border dispute as a 
potential cause, the border issue stands out as a relevant factor in the findings of this thesis. 
In a report for Refugees International, on the situation in Ethiopia in 2018, Mark Yarnell 
suggests that “intercommunal violence stemming from unresolved grievances has broken out 
in several parts of the country” (Yarnell, 2018). This is possibly getting closer to the actual 
causes of the conflict, though he does not elaborate on what these potential grievances are. 
Either way the hypothesises appears to be that that the issues in the conflicts are not new, but 
rather old grievances that have re-emerged. To uncover the nature of these grievances more 
research is necessary.    
On the other hand, there have also been some tentative attempts at connecting the Guji-Gedeo 
conflict to the ongoing changes at the federal level (T.  Gardner, 2019; Mules, 11.08.2018; 
Yusuf, 2019). Semir Yusef for example argues that political liberalisation at the federal level 
and weaker state power has caused re-eruption of several conflicts in 2018, the Guji-Gedeo 
conflict being one of them. (Yusuf, 2019, p. 10) Similarly to Yarnell, he suggests that old 
unresolved grievances re-emerged with the liberalisation of the country, and that certain 
actors took advantage of the national situation to fuel conflict between the Guji and Gedeo 
ethnic groups (Yusuf, 2019, p. 8). But precisely what these grievances are remains unclear. 
These reports and news articles are, so far, insufficient to explain the events that took place in 
the Guji and Gedeo zones in 2018. These suggested causes are not built on in-depth academic 
research nor are most of them (seemingly) supported by evidence. The lack of research 
available on these matters underlines the research gap this thesis is seeking to fill, namely to 
investigate what happened between the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups in 2018, and hence 
what caused the outbreak of violent conflict. Several of these suggested causes do come up in 
the data collected in this study, and so we will return to some of these points in later chapters.  
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3.3 Conclusion 
There is a certain overlap between this literature review, and the background, the conceptual 
framework, and the analysis – in the sense that topics mentioned in this chapter will be 
elaborated upon or expanded in other sections. This chapter simply shows what previous 
research has found on this topic, to give a foundation of relevant literature, for this study to 
build upon. 
When this study was conducted, no in-depth research appeared to have been executed 
specifically on the causes of the 2018 conflict. As I have stated multiple times in this chapter. 
That said, some time has passed since the data was collected and, while the researcher is not 
aware of any similar studies, it is entirely possible that other research has been conducted in 
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Chapter 4 Methodological Framework  
The purpose of this chapter is to reflect upon the methodological framework of the thesis, as 
well as to account for the methods and tools used for data collection and analysis.  
The thesis aims to answer the following research questions:  
1) What are the core issues in the conflict between the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups? 
2) Why did conflict break out in April 2018 specifically?  
3) How does the 2018 conflict relate to the previous conflicts between the two groups? 
With these research questions in mind, this chapter sets out to explain the methodological 
approach and the methods used in the project. The first section accounts for the methodology 
in itself, followed by the methods of data collection and analysis. Then comes a brief 
discussion of certain aspects related to the fieldwork itself: study area, sampling of 
informants, and use of field assistants and translators. The last section accounts for the 
researcher’s role and position, in other words the reflexivity, as well as ethical considerations 
and limitations of the study.  
4.1 Methodology 
This thesis is a qualitative study of an intergroup conflict in Ethiopia. Seeing that it focuses on 
one case and does not seek to produce results that can be generalized, but rather aims to gain 
deeper insight, is a clear indication that the qualitative research approach is well suited for this 
study.  
Qualitative research is known to emphasise the context and the research process, which 
allows for greater flexibility in the study itself. The approach is also characterized by an aim 
to generate in-depth insight and an idea of seeing through the eyes of the people being 
studied, which is in line with this study (Bryman, 2012, pp. 398-403). These characteristics 
are further reflected in the methods associated with qualitative research, as illustrated 
throughout in this chapter. 
4.2 Methods of Data Collection  
The main method of data collection in this project was semi-structured interviews with 
various actors involved in the conflict and displacement situation of 2018. The decision to 
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conduct interviews was made with consideration to my research questions, which required in-
depth insight into certain social phenomena. The best way to gather such information is to 
speak with people directly involved. In other words, it was important to hear from people 
themselves, and interviews are well suited for the gathering of such detailed data. An 
argument in favour of the qualitative research approach is that methods of a qualitative nature, 
and interviews in particular, are especially well suited for contextualizing, describing, 
interpreting and gaining in-depth insight (Hennink, Hutter, & Bailey, 2020, pp. 9-15). 
Much like qualitative research overall, interviews in more unstructured forms are criticized 
for not giving results that can be generalized outside of the sample group (Bryman, 2012, p. 
12). This, as established, was not a goal for this project. On the other hand, less structured 
interviews can provide a deeper understanding of the informants’ overall perceptions, 
thoughts, emotions, opinions, and motivations. In addition, research methods like less 
structured interviews also allow the researcher to keep a more open mind regarding what he 
or she needs to know about so that concepts and theories can emerge out of the data (Bryman, 
2012, p. 12). Because I – the researcher of this project – was an outsider, which is discussed 
later in the chapter, it only seemed right to take such an open approach. 
The discussion around less structured interviews goes both ways, some researchers are 
concerned with any form of structure in interviews, as it “will not allow genuine access to the 
world views of members of a social setting or of people sharing common attributes are likely 
to favour an unstructured interview” (Bryman, 2012, p. 472). Seeing that I already had a clear 
topic in mind and knew to some degree what I wanted to research, the unstructured form of 
interview seemed a little too vague. On the basis of these considerations I chose to do semi-
structured interviews as they  “[allow] more specific issues to be addressed” (Bryman, 2012, 
p. 472). Semi-structured interviews were well suited for this study as they kept some structure 
and consistency – for the researcher to ask certain specific questions – but also gave the 
opportunity to follow up on any other points of interest that might emerge (Bryman, 2012, p. 
471). I did utilize an interview guide, to maintain some consistency throughout the data 
collection. 
When discussing sensitive topics, like in this thesis, the flexibility of semi-structured 
interviews proved very useful. It allowed me to learn from my participants as they took the 
time to elaborate and explain cultural and historical events of which I, as an outsider, was 
lacking knowledge. The less structured form of interviewing also allowed the participants to 
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better express what they themselves believe to be important – which is not always what we as 
researchers expect to find (Hennink et al., 2020, pp. 116-117). 
4.2.1 Study Area  
The decision to do research in Ethiopia was reached when I got the opportunity to partake in a 
fieldwork exchange program between the University of Tromsø and Dilla University in 
Ethiopia. Dilla is located in the Gedeo Zone so I chose to focus my research on the ongoing 
situation between Guji and Gedeo, seeing that I had the opportunity to do extended fieldwork 
in the area. The fieldwork exchange agreement granted me economic support through UiT 
and practical support in the field from Dilla University. Without this support, the execution of 
this project would not have been possible. 
At the point of arrival in the field, the situation was already radically different from what I 
had studied up on beforehand, meaning that the situation was changing rapidly so the 
information available online was already outdated. For example, by the time I arrived most of 
the displaced persons had already moved back to their place of origin, making it increasingly 
difficult to get in touch with them. Thus, some time was spent reorienting myself and waiting 
for the necessary support letters from Dilla University and the local government.  
It was of importance to gather data from both of the involved groups, that entailed some 
traveling across the Gedeo and Guji zones. Primarily I collected data in the towns of Bule 
Hora, Dilla, and Yigetcaffer. Some interviews were also executed in more local areas of 
Gedeb woreda, as well as Garba and Yericho villages (see map in Appendix 2). This 
travelling was both time consuming and inconvenient, as I was mostly reliant on public 
transport. Despite that, moving around to these different places was crucial to ensure that I 
gathered diverse and reliable data.  
As I will touch upon later in this chapter, my traveling was limited by practical concerns as 
well as the security situation in the field. I knew from the start that I wanted to gather data in 
Dilla and Bule Hora – being the main towns in the Gedeo and West-Guji zones. But otherwise 
the places visited were picked while I was in the field, based on practical and security related 
considerations and was largely dependent what was feasible at the time. For example, I would 
not have been able to visit more remote areas if not for assistance from NGOs, who let me 
travel with them, observe their work, and put me in contact with locals there.  
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4.2.2 Study Population  
With the decision to do semi-structured interviews in mind, the selection of my interview 
subjects started out somewhat purposely, as I aimed to collect diverse data from various 
involved actors in order to shed light on different narratives and opinions. With the aim to 
gather diverse data from as many categories of people as possible, I was able to speak to 
representatives from the following groups: government officials, NGO workers, IDPs, 
returnees, and elders from local communities. I also aimed for diversity within these groups, 
by interviewing women and people in more remote areas, when possible.  
In order to gain in-depth data, I executed a total of 37 interviews during my time in the field, 
of which three were group-interviews (see Appendix 3 for a more detailed list of participants). 
The interviews lasted from about 10 minutes to over an hour, depending on the informant’s 
answers and available time. In the end, who I was able to speak with largely depended on 
feasibility, because of the sensitivity of the topic, as well as mobility and security issues. With 
this in mind, as a starting point, my specific informants were mostly chosen through the 
snowballing method my arrival in the field.  
“Snowball sampling is a sampling technique in which the researcher samples initially a small 
group of people relevant to the research questions, and these sampled participants propose 
other participants who have had the experience or characteristics relevant to the research. 
These participants will then suggest others and so on.” (Bryman, 2012, p. 424) 
Meaning essentially that I went around to NGOs and government offices to see who was 
willing to speak to me, and my informants then often referred me to other people with 
relevant knowledge or involvement in the situation. 
4.2.3 Fieldwork Assistants and Translators 
During my time in the field I made use of both fieldwork assistants and translators. In the 
process of gaining access I did also receive support letters both from Dilla University and the 
Guji Zonal Administration Office in Bule Hora. This was of great help when I approached my 
informants, as these support letters gave me some credibility as a researcher. 
Some of my interviews were executed with the assistance of local fieldwork assistants. These 
were primarily students from Dilla University that the fieldwork exchange representatives at 
Dilla University put me in contact with. Although the use of fieldwork assistants are 
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somewhat disputed they were crucial for me as an outsider to gain access and communicate 
with people in the field. They also offered great assistance and advised me on the practical 
execution of the fieldwork – such as the security situation, moving around in the field and 
finding informants. My fieldwork assistants also worked as translators when the informants 
did not speak English. The use of fieldwork assistants and translators is cautioned against by 
critics, especially when they are not professionals, for example because data might get 
excluded or lost in translation (Bryman, 2012, p. 151). I did consider this, and I cannot be 
sure that is not the case for my interviews too, but due to the language barrier I would simply 
not have been able to conduct the interviews without them. An advantage of recording the 
interviews is that I am able to go back and check the translation (or have someone with 
proficiency in the language do so) if any problems were to arise. 
In addition to the support from Dilla University and their students, I also received some 
assistance from various humanitarian organizations working in the area. Some of the aid 
workers I initially interviewed assisted me by allowing me to travel with them, by facilitating 
interviews with local actors they had previously worked with, and even helping with 
translation in these interviews if necessary. To ensure the anonymity of my informants, the 
specific organisations are not listed here. 
4.2.4 Data Analysis 
All of my interviews were recorded, to ensure that the information was relayed correctly later, 
and then stored on a password protected USB-device to ensure confidentiality. The next step 
was transcription, which was a very lengthy process considering the number of interviews. 
After transcription, the data was coded thematically, and from there a thematic analysis was 
used to analyse the data. Used across many fields, a thematic analysis is “a method for 
identifying, analysing, organizing, describing, and reporting themes found within a data set” 
(Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 2). This approach was well suited for my study 
because I was attempting to identify different opinions and perspectives across my data, 
which is precisely in line with the thematic form of analysis (Bryman, 2012, p. 578). Due to 
the amount of material collected in the field, I made use of the program NVivo to organize, 
code, and analyse my data.  
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4.3 Reflexivity, Reflections, and Ethical Considerations 
Reflexivity requires researchers to “self-critically examine one’s own beliefs and 
assumptions” as well as “ones relationships with those whom one studies” (Bryman, 2012, 
pp. 393-394). In other words, reflexivity underlines the importance for a researcher to reflect 
upon and be critical of their own role in the research, which is what I will attempt to do in this 
section.  
4.3.1 Researcher’s Role  
The objectivity of research is subject to much debate within academia. Bryman argues that 
there is a “growing recognition that it is not feasible to keep the values that a researcher 
holds totally in check” (Bryman, 2012, p. 39). With values, he means “the personal beliefs or 
the feelings of a researcher” which can affect the researcher and his or her research in many 
ways. Having accepted that a researcher cannot be fully free of values, the researcher should 
therefore reflect over potential biases in their own research and consider how they might have 
affected the research process. In this section I will first consider how I – as the researcher – 
have affected the study in itself. Secondly, I will discuss some issues in doing research as an 
outsider. Lastly, follows a reflection on my role in the data-collection process, and in 
particular my interaction with the informants. 
It should already be obvious that the researcher affects all parts of the research process, such 
as the “choice of research area; formulation of research question; choice of method; 
formulation of research design and data-collection techniques; implementation of data 
collection; analysis of data; interpretation of data; and conclusions” (Bryman, 2012, p. 39). I 
outlined my personal motivation for doing this specific study in the Introduction Chapter (see 
section 1.1) of this thesis, that section shows how I – the researcher – have affected this study 
from the very start, when I chose a research topic.  
4.3.1.1 Researchers Background  
From the very beginning, researchers tend to focus on what they themselves find significant, 
which is affected by their own opinions and lives (Bryman, 2012, p. 405). Researchers are 
shaped by their lives and that affects how they interpret what they see around them. I have an 
academic background in History and Political Science, and currently I am enrolled in a 
master’s program in Peace and Conflict Transformation. With a background in history, for 
example, I tend to place an emphasis on the context of events. On this same note, it is very 
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likely that my upbringing and education in Norway – a wealthy western country –affects the 
way I interpret what I see around me, and thus also this study.  
4.3.1.2 Doing Research in Indigenous Contexts  
In this discussion I would first like to shed light on some of the issues of doing research in 
indigenous communities. In academia there is an ongoing debate on doing research in 
indigenous contexts, and what ethical, epistemological, and methodological issues that brings 
about. Webster and John (2010) correctly point out that there is a past “history of exploitive 
research that contributed little to no benefit, or worse, research that caused damaging effects 
for Indigenous peoples and their communities” (Webster & John, 2010, p. 175). They also 
state that “dilemmas stemming from the often incongruous fit between methods of collecting, 
analysing and presenting data that characterise the Western academic tradition and 
Indigenous ways of knowing, communicating and sharing knowledge” (Webster & John, 
2010, pp. 175-176). 
The last point is of particular concern when the researcher is an outsider, meaning that they 
are not from that indigenous group, because important understandings might be lost, either 
because the researcher fails to understand or because the academic framework in which the 
research is executed does not account for it. The common western-dominated scientific 
approaches do not always fit into the indigenous contexts. For example, for the Guji ethnic 
group, “peace is broadly understood as a continuous flow of relationships between the people 
and their human and nonhuman environments… Peace is not a free gift, because maintaining 
it requires continuous and earnest negotiation, social actions, and cooperation among many 
stakeholders who possess political, cultural, and spiritual powers” (Asebe Debelo  Regassa 
& Jirata, 2018, p. 210). This differs from the common western approaches to peace that often 
have a simpler (negative) understanding of the concept (see section 5.5). Hence, if one were 
to study peace among the Guji the more common academic conceptualizations of “peace” 
might lead to oversights and information getting lost in the process.  
4.3.1.3 Doing Research as an Outsider 
There are many challenges associated with researching as an outsider and to studying cultures 
different from your own. The study of the “other” remains a debated subject among 
researchers, and brings with it certain dilemmas for the researcher to reflect upon, some of 
which have been mentioned already. DeLuca and Maddox state that “one can only 
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understand the Other through reflecting on its similarity to, and difference from, the Self” 
(DeLuca & Maddox, 2016, p. 286). Therefore, they argue in outsider research “any 
representation is only partial and based on the specific limitations of the particular 
researcher’s positionality and perspective” (DeLuca & Maddox, 2016, p. 286) In other words 
outside researchers are limited by their positionality in their understanding of the “other”.  
From the start, I too had concerns about doing fieldwork in a community that was very 
different from the one I grew up in. I believe one cannot hope to fully understand complex 
cultures in such a short period of time, and it is entirely possible that I – as an outsider – failed 
to grasp key cultural aspects to the situation that might have been obvious to an insider. To 
address this issue, I studied academic literature on the groups culture and history beforehand, 
and I was able to learn a lot from my informants who patiently explained when my 
knowledge was lacking.  
Another key challenge was that I do not speak the local languages, which caused some 
misunderstandings and posed a barrier when interacting with my informants, as I could not 
speak with them directly, I used translators to tackle this issue. At the same time though, my 
outsider position appeared to make some people more positive towards my research, with 
regards to partiality and bias. I was not affiliated with either of the involved groups, and some 
of my informants did express hope that I could therefore be more objective in my research. 
Ethnic identity plays a large role in Ethiopia (see Chapter 5), but as an outsider I had no 
affiliation with either of the groups,15 and thus I could approach the situation with an open 
mind. Like I mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, previous research seems to have 
been executed predominantly by Ethiopian researchers, so perhaps I can offer some different 
insights. 
From the beginning, I tried to approach this project with an open mind, and to be respectful 
towards my informants, in the sense that they were the “experts” on this situation and I was 
simply there to learn from their knowledge. After all, an aim was to see through their eyes, 
and how they saw the world around them, how they understood (or did not understand) the 
conflict was key. As an outsider this was especially important.  
 
15 Other than the fact that my fieldwork exchange was arranged through Dilla University in the Gedeo zone. 
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I brought many characteristics with me to the field, that likely affected the study and my 
interaction with the informants. I am a young, unmarried, white woman from Norway. My 
appearance in itself clearly set me apart from the people in the research area, they could 
immediately identify me as an outsider. In my interaction with people in the field, I got a 
feeling that my different appearance affected the way people approached me. For example, 
people were quite curious about what I was doing in the area, and especially as a young 
woman.  
Still, it is not enough to reflect on my background and how that has affected the research; it is 
also necessary to consider my interaction with the informants and how I – as the researcher – 
might have affected them and their responses. Bryman states that the responses of the 
participants during interviews would also be affected by the researchers characteristics, such 
as age, gender, and appearances (Bryman, 2012, p. 405). With regards to my research, as a 
foreign researcher people seemed to consider me “important”, at least it appeared that way to 
me. That was a strange feeling because I was younger than most of my informants, and they 
certainly knew more about the situation than I did. Still most people were positive towards 
my research, and certainly my appearance and the characteristics mentioned above might 
have affected their willingness to speak with me and to take part in the study – a point we will 
consider in the next section.  
4.3.1.4 Power Dynamics 
It is also necessary to consider the power dimensions between me – as the researcher – and 
my informants. Muhammad et. al argues that researchers “represent centers of power, 
privilege, and status within their formal institutions, as well as within the production of 
scientific knowledge itself. Researchers also may have power and privilege from their class, 
education, racial/ethnic backgrounds, or other identity positions” (Muhammad et al., 2015, p. 
1046). We have discussed several characteristics already, that gives me – the researchers – 
privilege and power, such as my education, upbringing and nationality. I also recognize that 
my life is different from the life of my informants – some more than others – for example 
apparent in the way I was able to travel across half the globe to do research in Ethiopia. I 
spoke to many different people during my time in the field and my relationships with my 
informants differed from person to person. There was, for example, a difference in my 
relations with the foreign aid workers I interviewed compared to the displaced persons who 
had lost their home and were in an extremely difficult situation at the time.   
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Like I stated above, I did sometimes get the sense that my appearance and other privileges 
affected the way people interacted with me. It was clear that I – as the researcher – had an 
effect on their answers and their attitude towards my project. For example, identifying me as 
an outsider, many informants took the time to explain historical and cultural matters that they 
thought I needed to understand – in particular related to the groups historical relations – I 
have tried to reflect these emphasises in this thesis.  
Furthermore, people took time out of their busy days to speak with me, I was treated 
respectfully, and people appeared to take me and my project quite seriously. This was likely 
affected by all the characteristics mentioned above, such as my affiliation with foreign and 
local universities or my foreign nationality. Because of these power dynamics it was 
especially important that people did not feel obligated to participate in my study or to answer 
any questions, to address this I spent time before each interview to go through the consent 
form, inform them of my study and their rights. During my time in the field I was able to see 
the potentially harmful effects of research when I asked employees at a government 
institution to participate in the study, and they refused because they had gotten into trouble 
when they participated in an interview in the past. I was also particularly careful when I 
approached people whom might have experienced trauma, emphasising that they should only 
answer the questions they were comfortable with. 
That brings us to one last question, what I can give back? To my informants, to Dilla 
University, but most importantly to the communities that this project studied. My thesis is 
dedicated to the people of Guji and Gedeo, ultimately because they are the ones suffering the 
consequences of this conflict. That underlines my hope – and the aim of this thesis – that the 
research and the findings from this project can be a steppingstone for future research and 
decision-making regarding this conflict and its resolution.  
4.3.2 Researcher’s position 
As a researcher, I would position myself in the epistemological position of interpretivism and 
the ontological position of constructivism. The interpretivist position is characterised by – in 
contrast to the scientific ideals of quantitative research – placing an emphasis on “the 
understanding of the social world through an examination of the interpretation of that world 
by its participants” (Bryman, 2012, p. 179). While the constructivist position, broadly 
speaking, argues that “social properties are outcomes of the interactions between individuals, 
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rather than phenomena out there and separate from those involved in its construction” 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 377). 
This position is quite typical for qualitative researchers and has largely been illustrated 
throughout this chapter. The interpretivist position has identified itself particularly through 
the methods applied, which shows how the study aims to gain a deeper understanding of the 
perspectives and opinions of the participants. Furthermore, the constructivist approach 
“recognizes that the categories, concepts, and theoretical level of an analysis emerge from 
the researcher’s interaction within the field and questions about the data” (Bryman, 2012, p. 
575). That is perhaps best illustrated by the inductive approach this project has taken on, in 
which such considerations have emerged on the basis of the fieldwork. 
4.3.3 Ethical considerations 
All of my interviews were recorded on a recording device and then transcribed to ensure that I 
relayed the information correctly. All data was safely stored on a password protected USB 
device, to ensure confidentiality and protection of privacy. In most cases written consent was 
collected, although in a few cases oral consent had to suffice as the translator relayed to me 
that the informants could not write or could not read and therefore did not feel comfortable 
signing the consent form. In reality, I had few problems with gaining consent from the 
informants, most informants understood the importance of the consent form. Even recording 
the interviews was not an issue, when the reason was explained to the informants.  
That said, I did decide to keep my informants anonymous. Still, I had to list them in 
categories based on characteristics that might affect their answers, e.g. ethnic group 
belonging, such categorization was also necessary to identify any repeating narratives or 
perspectives. In the appendix one can therefore find a more detailed list of the informants, in 
which the informants are numbered and listed based on: their location and occupation or 
ethnic group belonging, gender and other relevant characteristics. No names were collected 
outside of the consent forms, and no names will be relied in this thesis. That decision was 
reached due to the sensitivity of the topic, I could not take the risk of any of my informants 
getting into trouble over anything they have told me. I also hope that might have encouraged 
them to speak openly about the situation.  
Furthermore, when speaking with locals, and in particular IDPs and returnees, who had 
recently experienced hardships and trauma, I tried to the best of my abilities to follow the “do 
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no harm” principle (Bryman, 2012, pp. 135-138). Still there is always the possibility that a 
researcher might end up causing trauma for the informants. That was a major concern for me. 
It was therefore important that the informants did not feel obligated to share anything, and I 
proceeded with caution when approaching people directly involved with the conflict. In the 
end, my experience was that my informants expressed gratitude and relief that someone came 
to listen to their stories and the challenges they had or were facing. Though, I did note that 
several of my informants mentioned a need for more psychosocial support due to trauma. 
4.3.4. Limitations and challenges 
During my time in the field I encountered a number of challenges, of which several were 
mentioned in this chapter already, this thesis was further limited by a range of factors. For 
example, a major challenge was the periodic lack of internet, which made communication and 
orientation in the field increasingly difficult. As the government of Ethiopia on several 
occasions turned the internet off nationally, sometimes for weeks at a time, it was often 
impossible to look things up, send emails or gather information online while in the field. This 
certainly did complicate my stay in the field. I overcame this by downloading material when I 
could, and by asking my contacts or informants when something was unclear 
Otherwise, my fieldwork was limited in terms of mobility, as I mostly had to rely on public 
transport, and therefore was unable to visit more remote or distant places. I did fortunately get 
a ride with a couple of aid organizations, but many of the organizations were also lacking 
transportation and could not bring me along. The most notable limitation in relation to 
mobility was certainly that I was not able to visit Kercha, the area where violence supposedly 
first broke out back in 2018. This was mainly due to security issues in the area, even the aid-
organizations had to suspend their activities for a while due to the presence of an armed group 
in the region, and so it was not safe for me to travel there either. I did my best to overcome 
this challenge. Fortunately, I was able to interview some aid workers that worked in the area, 
as well as some displaced persons from Kercha, who were unable to return due to the security 
situation. In addition, I had scheduled an interview with a government official from the local 
government in Kercha, that had been in office in 2018 and would have information about the 
events that took place there. Unfortunately, my fieldwork assistant informed me that he got 
arrested on the day we were supposed to hold the interview, for reasons unknown to us. 
Another limitation would be language, as touched upon previously in this chapter. Aside from 
the need for a translator, which, as established, can affect the data-collection, language limited 
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this research in a number of ways. Because I do not speak the local language there is a lot of 
information I could not access, ranging from local texts and books about the groups’ culture 
and history, to government documents, statistics, and so on. Even during some of the 
interviews conducted in English, my informants struggled to express themselves and get the 
point across, as it was not their first language, nor mine. So, the language barrier was certainly 
there. I did my best to overcome this with the use of translators and by confirming with the 
informants when something was unclear. 
Time could be labelled another limitation, as it did limit the collection of data. I spent a 
relatively long time in the field, over a month, and thus conducted a large number of 
interviews. But, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, data collection must end at some 
point, and so in this study it is limited to the time I spent in the field. Events that have taken 
place after I left the field will not be taken into account.  
4.4. Summary of key points 
This chapter has discussed the methodology and methods utilized in the project. I have here 
accounted for the data-collection and analysis process as well as my position as a researcher 
to ensure the reflexivity of the project. The chapter concluded with some ethical 
considerations and limitations of relevance for the study. It is necessary for a researcher to 
reflect on the methods and methodology of their research, in order to account for how the 
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Chapter 5 Conceptual framework  
The theories and concepts used in this thesis were derived inductively, which is the case for 
many qualitative studies, meaning that they were picked and developed as outcomes of the 
research process (Bryman, 2012, p. 412). In addition, this thesis does not aim to confirm or 
reject any theory in particular. Instead it will use different concepts and theories to answer the 
following research questions:  
1) What are the core issues in the conflict between the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups? 
2) Why did conflict break out in April 2018 specifically?  
3) How does the 2018 conflict relate to the previous conflicts between the two groups? 
Because this thesis attempts to cover several aspects and perspectives on the conflict, one 
theory in itself cannot provide a sufficient explanation. Thus, this chapter consists of a 
conceptual framework, to better frame research and guide the various parts of the analysis. 
The conceptual framework will lend from previous research, theories and findings to define 
key concepts and explain relevant phenomenon for this study specifically. Due to the limited 
space, the focus have been to pull pieces and points of literature that are especially relevant 
for this specific study.   
The chapter will start with a brief discussion of communal conflict, which is the subject of 
this research, considering why groups get into (violent) conflict in the first place. Then 
follows a conceptualization of peace, and an account of the conflict recurrence phenomenon. 
The next section considers the concept of ethnicity, and the role of ethnicity in the Ethiopian 
context. All the various concepts outlined in this chapter attempt to provide a conceptual 
framework that will give a foundation for the discussion of the collected data in the analysis 
chapter (Chapter 6).  
5.1 Communal Conflict 
“Conflict” as a term is used in different ways across disciplines and traditions. Most 
definitions agree that, at the very least, conflict includes two or more parties, that are in some 
sort of disagreement (“«Conflict»,”). More specifically though, conflicts come in many 
different forms. Attempts at classifying conflict are often based on various characteristics, 
such as where the conflict takes place or who the actors are. For example, researchers often 
divides conflict into internal/intra-state conflict and inter-state conflicts, in which the former 
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takes place within the borders of the state, while the latter takes place between states (Frère & 
Wilen, 2015, pp. 1-2). The conflict studied in this thesis is internal, as it takes place within the 
borders of Ethiopia, and will be further classified as a communal conflict.  
Communal conflicts can be defined as defined as “…violent conflict between non-state 
groups that are organized based on communal identities” (Brosché, 2015, p. 4) From this 
short definition there are several points that need some clarification. First of all, conflicts can 
be violent and non-violent, the difference being that “violent conflict involves at least two 
parties using physical force to resolve competing claims or interests” (Frère & Wilen, 2015, 
p. 2). Furthermore, the actors involved in communal conflicts, are non-state groups. That 
implies that none of the parties have state-power, for example, neither control the military. 
That said, the state might still be involved in the conflict, as a supporter or as part of the 
resolution process, that is the case for the Guji and Gedeo in which the state has been heavily 
involved in the settling of the conflict (Interview 6, 17 & 21). 
A key point in the definition is that in communal conflicts the groups are organized on a basis 
of communal identities, which could be understood as “subjective group identification” based 
on for example a common history, culture or core values (Elefversson & Brosché, 2012). For 
the Guji and the Gedeo this communal identity would be their ethnic groups. Communal 
conflicts are normally (but not always) “local”, meaning limited to a smaller (specific) area, 
compared to civil wars and other forms of intra-state conflict (Elefversson & Brosché, 2012). 
The Guji-Gedeo conflict, was largely limited to the two groups and their zones. What is clear 
from the definition is that the nature of communal conflicts is different from other forms of 
conflict. Aside from being more localized, there is normally a lower level of organization, 
communal conflicts can also appear brief and sporadic compared to other forms of conflict 
(Elefversson & Brosché, 2012). 
Here another clarification is needed. In this thesis I refer to some people as “local” or “local 
actors” with that I mean to imply that they are from the specific area, community or 
neighbourhood that is being discussed. The “local” is a disputed topic in peace research at the 
moment (Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017, pp. 422-423), in this case it is simply meant to illustrate 
to the reader that said person is from one specific place and hence have in-depth knowledge, 
information or insight on the situation in this specific area. 
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The majority of communal conflicts appears to have taken place in Africa. Further research 
on the issue is needed to explain why that is the case, in fact researchers of communal conflict 
argue that this particular form of conflict so far is understudied in academia (Elefversson & 
Brosché, 2012). However, environmental scarcity in combination with weak state structures, 
patronage systems and politicised ethnic identity have been proposed as factors of relevance 
(Elefversson & Brosché, 2012). 
5.1.1 Why Do Groups Get Into (Violent) Conflict? 
Having clarified the type of conflict we are dealing with in this study we still know little 
about why groups gets into conflict in the first place. Bottom line Johan Galtung attributes 
conflict to groups incompatible coals (J.  Galtung, 2009, p. 108). However, conflict arises in 
different contexts, over a range of different “causes”. 
Gurr argued in 1993 that there traditionally were two competing perspectives on analysis of 
violent conflict: The relative deprivation theory which “treats discontent about unjust 
deprivation as the primary motivational force of political action” and the group mobilization 
theory that “emphasizes the calculated mobilization of group resources in response to 
changing political opportunities” (Gurr, 1993, p. 167). Having said that, the arguments are 
tied together, in conflict both can often be present. Whether the causes of the conflict is 
related to “grievance” or “opportunity” there is a feeling of deprivation involved (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 1998; Hoeffler, 2011).  
Lischer, on the other hand, argued in her 1999 article that “communal war results from two 
types of change – increases in fear and increases in the feasibility of gaining aims by force” 
(Lischer, 1999, p. 331). Shortly explained she claims that fear (or insecurity) can become a 
trigger for (violent) conflict when “an oppressed group perceives a heightened threat to its 
cultural or physical survival” (Lischer, 1999, p. 331). In this case it is fear of domination or 
extinction that causes conflict, and in particular when the group thinks they can reduce or 
avoid the risk through use of violence. The other point, “increasing feasibility” for violence, 
can relate to “shifts in relative military capability, heightened international legitimacy, and 
false optimism”. Lischer suggests that the combination of “a security dilemma and the ability 
to act determines when, and if, simmering ethnic tensions will erupt into violence” (Lischer, 
1999, pp. 331-333). 
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The point is, whatever the reason, people do not get into conflict randomly – there are 
rationale and motivation behind the outbreak of conflict. To uncover the driving forces of 
conflict and to consider the motivation of the people involved is key to understand any 
conflict. These theories attempt to say something about why (violent) conflict break out, and 
what motivates people to take up arms. Some of these theories were originally intended for 
civil wars, but have since been used on various forms of conflict, such as communal conflict. 
Even so, conflict often break out over very specific issues, different to each conflict. Research 
on communal conflict specifically have this far suggested that these conflicts are diverse in 
nature, still some researchers have attempted some overarching grouping of causes. 
For example, Uexkull & Pettersson identifies overarching categories, arguing that communal 
conflicts revolve around territory and/or authority, with a residual third minor category made 
up of lootable resources and conflict over religious issues. The least common category 
“lootable resources” in most cases (in the African context) means fighting over livestock, but 
other identified resources are for example timber or food relief. Conflicts over “authority” 
includes conflicts where the parties’ main goal is to control the other party. Authority can be 
divided into the subcategories “formal”, often taking place in connection with elections, and 
“informal” which relates to the leadership of a group or a community (Uexkull & Pettersson, 
2018). The last category, “territory” was identified as the most common, linked to 68% of the 
conflicts, in the study of communal conflicts between 1989 and 2011. This links to two sub-
categories, first there is “land-use” conflicts where water or agricultural lands are the 
contention issues. The second and most common sub-category is “territorial issues”, Uexkull 
& Pettersson specifically points out that these conflicts often revolves around “the borders of 
administrative districts, such as… the border of districts that are dominated by different 
ethnic groups” (Uexkull & Pettersson, 2018, pp. 960-961).  
Similarly Brosche and Elefversson 2012 outlines several different types of communal 
conflicts, largely along the same lines as Uexkull and Pettersson. A first category in which 
communal conflicts occur over political issues – in relation to national or local elections. And 
a second category in which disagreement over land is the central issue. Here they identify a 
number of under categories, such as herder-farmer conflicts and “… ‘sons of the soil’ 
conflicts, where the indigenous perceive themselves as the rightful owners of the land 
(Elefversson & Brosché, 2012, pp. 33-35). These conflicts take place between “original 
inhabitants of a locality against more recent settlers. Similarly related to control over land, 
but fought along another identity dimension” (Elefversson & Brosché, 2012, pp. 35-36). 
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Having said that these categories are often interconnected, Torbjörnsson points out that “the 
majority of communal conflicts in Africa are over land… and conflicts belonging to other 
categories often originate in issues over land” (Torbjörnsson, 2016, p. 16). That is because 
“conflicts over authority often have a land component as power means access to land and vice 
versa. Resource conflicts are also often connected to land” (Torbjörnsson, 2016, p. 16). As we 
will see in the analysis chapter even in the case of the Guji-Gedeo conflict, most of the 
identified themes are in some way related to the issue of “land”. 
Brosche and Elfversson makes an interesting link between “authority” and “land” conflicts 
when they point out that “communal conflicts can be an effective way of gaining access to 
land as the number of people displaced often is huge, even when the number of deaths is 
fairly limited” (Elefversson & Brosché, 2012, p. 38). In these cases the authors argue, 
“ruthless political entrepreneurs”, can use “the local populations’ grievances for land” to 
instigate conflict. Similarily Torbjörnsson argues “Elites, politicians or businessmen often use 
grievances for their own greedy purposes. There are countless examples of people in power 
manipulating local grievances for their personal enrichment.” (Torbjörnsson, 2016, pp. 18-
19) In other words, specific actors might play a decisive role in violent conflicts, and must be 
identified to understand the motivations behind the outbreak of conflict. 
Another interesting study was executed by Brosche 2015, in which he argues that weak states 
and government bias is linked closely to communal conflicts turning violent (Brosché, 2015). 
Communal conflicts take place within the state, and the states involvement is crucial. If the 
state is not able to handle a raising conflict it is more likely to turn violent. The same is true if 
the state shows a bias towards one party (Brosché, 2015). And especially if people have 
experienced conflict in the past. If they feel cannot rely on the state to maintain security, or 
the state has failed to do so in the past, they might resort to violent self-help tactics. “A history 
of inter-group violence, grievances, and fear reduce the sense of security and encourage 
resort to self-help tactics” (Hazen, 2013) In other words, such conflicts should be considered 
in connection with the overall national context in which they take place.  
Ultimately, there are many contesting theories on how we can understand violent conflict. 
The key points of this section is that violent conflict break out over a range of different 
(interconnected) causes, be it economic, political or cultural. Furthermore, people or groups 
do not fight each other randomly, there are motives and goals behind violent conflict. An 
understanding of the causes behind any conflict, and the processes of mobilization leading up 
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to the outbreak of violence are necessary if one hopes to understand any violent conflict. That 
is precisely what this thesis attempt to do with the Guji-Gedeo conflict of 2018, the causes 
and the processes leading up to the conflict will be discussed in depth in the analysis chapter 
(Ch 6) of this thesis.   
5.2 Peace  
One can hardly talk about conflict without some understanding of what peace is, it is therefore 
necessary to briefly define the concept of “peace”. Peace in itself is an abstract concept, 
which makes it hard to define. Johan Galtung suggests that any understanding of peace at the 
very least means an “absence of direct violence between states, engaged in by military and 
others in general; and the absence of massive killing of categories of humans in particular” (J. 
Galtung, 2012, p. 75). Such absence of direct violence Galtung labels “negative peace”, and 
for a long time this was the general understanding of peace, meaning that when there was not 
war there was peace. However, Galtung argued strongly that violence is not only direct 
physical violence. Violence can also be experienced in cultures or structures of the society 
overall (e.g. as gender or poverty) – he calls this cultural and structural violence. In order to 
achieve a “positive” form of peace all three forms of violence must be absent (J. Galtung, 
2012, pp. 75-76). Over the last few decades this understanding has gained recognition 
internationally – and among researchers there is now relative agreement that absence of direct 
violence does not necessarily equal peace.  
Peacebuilding is not within the scope of this thesis, however it is necessary to properly 
conceptualize peace in order to understand conflict. This study understand peace in a positive 
way and argue that the negative understanding of peace does not create a sustainable peace. 
With sustainable peace, shortly explained, I mean a “lasting peace”. The following section on 
recurring conflict should make it particularly clear that the absence of direct violence is not 
necessary peace, and that putting an end to violent conflict does not mean that the conflict 
issues are resolved nor that any sort of sustainable peace has been reached.  
5.3 Conflict Recurrence 
Statistically it is argued that 60% of all conflicts recur, and after 2018 it would only be right 
to consider the fact that the conflict between Guji and Gedeo potentially is recurring (S. 
Gates, H. M. Nygård, & E. Trappeniers, 2016, p. 1). This is, after all, the third time the groups 
have been in conflict. The findings in this thesis suggests that the concept of recurring conflict 
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is highly relevant in this case, that will become more obvious in the next chapter – in which 
the causes for conflict are analysed.  
PRIO suggests that the conventional rule among researchers is to use a “two-year rule”. 
Meaning that two years of peace means the conflict has “ended”. That appears to imply a 
negative understanding of peace, as two years without violence equals peace. “If the fighting 
resumes after less than two years, the conflict is defined as on-going. If a conflict starts again 
after a two- year period of no conflict, the conflict has recurred” (S Gates et al., 2016, p. 3). 
Furthermore, the recurred conflict must involve the same parties that were involved in the 
first conflict. “Such cases are considered to be ‘recurring conflict’. A conflict involving a new 
actor(s)… is regarded to be new conflict” (S Gates et al., 2016, p. 3). The case of Guji and 
Gedeo fits these criteria, as conflict broke out after 20 years of relative stability, among the 
same parties – Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups – as in 1995 and 1998.  
In cases of recurring conflict unresolved grievances are (often) present in the society. 
“Recurring conflict is symptomatic of unaddressed grievances, and lasting peace will not be 
achieved until these issues are addressed” (S Gates et al., 2016, p. 4). The conflict can lay 
dormant for a long period of time, and at the surface the society can be in a state of seeming 
stability or peace. Then the conflict breaks out again, usually over some of the very same 
issues (as they remained unresolved), and this illustrates how the society was not truly at 
“peace”. Even though violent conflict was absent, the unresolved conflict issues remained 
under the surface. 
There is still some disagreement over what factors lead to conflict recurrence. It is suggested 
that the outcome and settlement of previous conflict(s) play a significant role (S Gates et al., 
2016, p. 1). The next chapter of this thesis precisely attempts to identify the causes for 
conflict, and determine how they in any way relate to the previous conflicts. In the Guji-
Gedeo case it is therefore a key point that the previous conflicts have not been fully settled – 
as briefly discussed in chapter 2 (literature review).  
5.3.1 Root Causes and Proximate Causes for Conflict 
When dealing with recurring conflicts the idea of separating causes for conflict into 
root/structural causes and proximate/immediate causes can be useful. “The structural causes 
of conflict are long- term or systemic causes of violent conflict that have become built into the 
norms, structures and policies of a society” (Herbert, 2017, p. 6). The root causes then are the 
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causes at the core of the conflict, the long-lasting causes that often do “recur” in recurring 
conflicts.  
“The proximate causes of conflict are more recent causes that change more quickly, can 
accentuate structural causes and lead to an escalation of violent conflict” (Herbert, 2017, p. 
6). The proximate causes are short time/immediate factors that spark each outbreak of 
(violent) conflict. This is particularly relevant because in recurring conflict the root causes can 
lay dormant for many years, before something (the proximate causes) makes (violent) conflict 
erupt again. The following chapter will attempt to identify both the core issues of the conflict 
(the root causes), meaning the main issues the conflict is fought over, and the immediate 
causes, meaning the specific factors that caused violence to break out between Guni and 
Gedeo in 2018.   
5.4 Inter-group Conflict in the Ethiopian Context 
This far we have looked at inter-group conflict generally. Studying inter-group conflict in 
post-1991 Ethiopia, as is the context of this study, there are some particular factors that must 
be conceptualized and understood. The most notable one is “ethnicity”. The role of 
“ethnicity” in the Ethiopian society is well illustrated with the Ethnic federalism, as we 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis the introduction of Ethnic federalism officially linked 
ethnicity and politics together, which had major consequences for the ethnic groups inhabiting 
the country. Ethnicity arguably became the main basis for mobilization for political issues, at 
the same time it is the main factor for group identification in Ethiopia (Tefari, 2012). 
Thinking back to the section on communal conflict, it was established that the parties are 
organized on the basis of some kind of “communal identity”, in this case that is “ethnicity” 
and their ethnic groups common identity. Therefore, to understand the nature of the conflict as 
well as the involved persons motivations, some understanding of “ethnicity” as a concept is 
necessary.  
5.4.1 Ethnicity 
The term “ethnic” can be traced to the Greek word “ethnos”, which over time had been used 
in association with race, tribe, people, group or in other words a community of common 
descent. More recently, shaped by the colonization period, the term became associate with 
“us” and “them”, in which “us” was the majority – seen as non-ethnic – and “them” was the 
minority, for example immigrants or indigenous people, seen as “ethnic” (Reuter, 2017). In 
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academia today ethnicity is understood in different ways across different traditions and 
disciplines, and a general definition is so far lacking, thus the concept is subject to much 
debate.  
At the very least, ethnicity has to do with identity and identification. Back in 1985 Horowitz 
defined ethnicity as a term which “designates a sense of collective belonging, which could be 
based on common descent, language, history, culture, race, or religion (or some combination 
of these)” (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 13-14). Eriksen turns the argument around, stating that “the 
term ‘ethnicity’ refers to relationships between groups whose members consider themselves 
distinctive…” (Eriksen, 2010, p. 10). In other words he argues it is not about the groups 
common identity, but about their identity in contrast to other groups (“us” and “them”), or 
rather ethnicity is not within but between groups. Either way ethnicity has to do with group 
identity, and refers to a group with certain common characteristics, that makes them perceive 
themselves different from other groups. Like other factors of identity, ethnicity is created and 
re-created through social interaction, in which a perception of the groups common identity 
and distinctiveness from other groups emerges (Eriksen, 2010, pp. 1-2). 
There are many ways to understand and conceptualize ethnicity and the creation of ethnic 
identity. Within the discourse three main perspectives can be identified. On the one hand the 
primordial view, in which ethnicity is ascriptive, seen as “something naturally inborn, fixed 
and stable” (Aalen, 2006, p. 247). On the other hand the constructivist understanding of 
ethnicity perceives ethnic identity as something socially constructed, that can be changed and 
formed in various ways (Williams, 2015, p. 149). Lastly the instrumentalist approach argues 
that ethnicity is “neither inherent in human nature nor intrinsically valuable” (Varshney, 
2009, p. 9). Within the instrumentalist view ethnicity is simply understood more as a strategic 
tool, for people or coalitions looking for economic or political gain, and thus a way of 
restricting resources and power to a minority (Williams, 2015, p. 148) 
In the Ethiopian case, the constitution of 1994 in its definition of ethnic groups takes a 
primordial approach to ethnicity. Article 39 in the constitution states that a nationality (ethnic 
group) is “a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or 
similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a 
common psychological make-up, and an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory” 
(Constitution of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1994). And thus defines 
ethnic groups as “clearly distinguishable cultural groups”, in which all members of the state 
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“must” be part of an ethnic group, in line with the primordial approach (Aalen, 2006, p. 247). 
This understanding of ethnicity has implications for how matters related to the ethnic groups 
are handled, some of which we will return to in the analysis.  
5.4.2 The role of Ethnicity in Ethiopian Inter-group Conflict  
Inter-group conflicts in Ethiopia tends to be classified as “ethnic conflicts”, that is also the 
case for the Guji-Gedeo conflicts, we will therefore consider this approach first. 
“The term “ethnic conflict” is often used loosly, to describe a wide range of intra-state 
conflicts that are not, in fact, ethnic in character” (Brown, 2010, p. 93). 
Ethnic conflict, much like ethnicity itself, has been subject to disagreement over how it 
should be defined. Looser definitions, like the one above, simply call it a dispute over an issue 
(political, economic, social, cultural or territorial) between two or more ethnic groups (Brown, 
2010, p. 93). A criteria of which the Guji Gedeo conflict does fit, seeing that it is in fact a 
conflict between two ethnic groups. However, definitions like this in reality makes any 
conflict between ethnic groups an “ethnic conflict”, whatever the conflict issues might be – 
which in a way defeats the purpose of the labelling and categorizing conflicts altogether. 
Other definitions are more precise, incorporating the goals and motivations of the involved 
actors. For example Stephen Wolff explains that in ethnic conflicts:  
“the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which 
the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions. Whatever the concrete 
issues over which conflict erupts, at least one of the conflict parties will explain its 
dissatisfaction in ethnic terms—that is, one party to the conflict will claim that its distinct 
ethnic identity is the reason why its members cannot realise their interests, why they do not 
have the same rights, or why their claims are not satisfied” (Wolff, 2006, p. 2).  
Even in this case ethnicity is often not the root cause of the conflict. As Wolff´s definition 
suggests it is necessary to study the actors, their motivations and the causes of a conflict 
between ethnic groups to determine to which degree it is actually “ethnic”. All intergroup 
conflicts in Ethiopia could technically be identified as ethnic (though they in reality are 
diverse in nature and cause), since all citizens must belong to an ethnic group, and when 
groups get into conflict that will be between two different ethnic groups. The decision to 
define the Guji-Gedeo conflict as a communal conflict, rather than an ethnic conflict, comes 
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from the findings of this thesis – in which ethnicity is not a root cause. This decision builds on 
the informants emphasis on the fact that ethnicity is not a core issue in the conflict, the 
concept of communal conflict better reflect this approach to the situation. 
It is then established that ethnicity is not the cause of the conflict, whether or not one 
classifies it as an ethnic conflict. With that in mind, it is time to consider what role ethnicity 
does play in the conflict. While not a main cause, “ethnicity” is still a factor of relevance in 
ethnic group conflict, in particular because of its role in the Ethiopian society. Since ethnicity 
has been politicized in Ethiopia, as we discussed in the background, we should ask how this 
affects inter-group conflicts in the country.  
Much like there are different ways to look at ethnicity as a concept, there are different ways to 
understand the role of ethnicity in conflict. First of all, ethnicity in itself is not violent, nor is 
ethnicity in itself a cause of conflict, as the primordial approach to ethnicity claims (Reuter, 
2017). In this case this is simply evident by how the Guji and Gedeo despite their differences 
lived together relatively harmoniously for decades before the 1990s. This is an important 
premise for this thesis, which should become clear in the following paragraphs, in which we 
consider other approaches to ethnicity and conflict. 
From a constructivist perspective “violent conflict is caused mainly by social and political 
systems that lead to inequality and grievances and do not offer options for the peaceful 
expression of differences” (Reuter, 2017). In this case the system is ethnic federalism, which 
we discussed in the background chapter. This constructivist perspective can be identified 
simply in the way critics argue that the system pits the ethnic groups against each other. A 
constructivist approach focuses on how the ethnic federalism causes grievances, and how the 
system does not provide sufficient peaceful to resolve issues and conflicts. We will discuss 
the role of the ethnic federalism more in-depth, in connection to the 2018 conflict, in the 
analysis.  
Lastly the instrumentalist perspective on ethnicity in conflict argues that“(ethnic) conflict 
arises if ethnic groups compete for the same goal—notably power, access to resources, or 
territory. The interests of a society’s elite class play an important role in mobilizing ethnic 
groups to engage in ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflict is thus similar to other political interest 
conflicts” (Reuter, 2017). This perspective on ethnic conflict is particularly interesting for this 
study, because of its emphasis on the role of society´s elites. We briefly mentioned that 
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specific actors might work to instigate communal conflict (see section 4.1.1), furthermore 
ethnicity is often linked to conflict specifically because of its strong potential for social 
mobilization (Wolff, 2006, pp. 5-6). 
Considering inter-group conflicts in post 1991 Ethiopia, several prominent researchers have 
made a case for the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity and conflict. In that case “conflicts 
take place because leaders strategically manipulate ethnicity for the sake of political power, 
or for extracting resources…” (Varshney, 2009, p. 9) Such conflict arise “…over scarce 
resources driven by the aims of political leaders for political or economic gains or a 
deliberate manipulation based on a rational decision to incite or encourage ethnic violence” 
(Williams, 2015, p. 148). This notion of ethnicity being used as a tool by the elites to mobilize 
the masses for their own interests and cause conflict, has been linked to many inter-group 
conflicts in Ethiopia after 1991, and also to the previous conflicts between Guji and Gedeo 
(see Chapter 3). Which illustrates the way ethnicity can be used to cause conflict, without the 
cause of the conflict actually being ethnicity in itself.  
Like stated in the literature review chapter of this thesis, previous research has argued that 
ethnicity in Ethiopia has been politicized, and even more so under the ethnic federalism, when 
ethnicity officially became as the basis for recognition and a way to address political issues. 
Under this system, researchers argue, ethnicity has been used (by elites) to mobilize people 
for (political) goals – in line with the instrumentalist approach mentioned above (Taye, 2017, 
p. 52). Hence, both the constructivist and the instrumentalist approaches are helpful to 
understand the conflict at hand, and it appears that we would lose important dimensions to the 
conflict by leaving one out.  
This lengthy discussion on ethnicity and inter-group conflict is necessary to understand the 
dynamics of ethnicity in conflicts in Ethiopia, as a means of group identity, in its role in the 
administrative structure, and as a tool for mobilization as well as to pursue political goals. 
This is fundamental if one hopes to understand the motivations behind conflict, as well as 
how people are mobilized for conflict in Ethiopia today. The analysis in the next chapter will 
consider what role ethnicity played in the 2018 conflict between Guji and Gedeo. 
Lastly, when discussing ethnicity and conflict in Ethiopia it is necessary to clarify that there 
should be a distinction between the understanding of ethnicity as a component of identity, and 
ethnicity as a political tool the way it is used under the ethnic federalism.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to outline some key concepts and theoretical approaches that will guide 
the analysis of this research project in the following chapter. The focus was mainly on inter-
group conflict, and what causes conflict between groups in the first place, as that is the key 
aspects necessary to answer the research questions of this theses. Furthermore, the chapter 
considered the recurrence of conflicts, an issue that related to the key findings of this project 
and is highly relevant to explain why the same parties get into conflict again and again. The 
chapter also discussed the concept of ethnicity, and the role of ethnicity in inter-group conflict 
in Ethiopia today. Ethnicity plays a large role in the Ethiopian society, and is frequently 
linked to conflicts in the country. In the case of Guji and Gedeo, however, the conflict should 
not be attributed to ethnicity only. The groups lived together for a long time, in seemingly 
peaceful relations and, as will be discussed in the next chapter of this thesis, a number of 
other factors plays a role in the conflict. Still ethnicity makes for a useful tool to understand 
particular dimensions of the conflict, the analysis will make use of both the constructivist and 
the instrumentalist perspectives to ethnicity and conflict. 
In the end, this chapter have only briefly listed the most relevant theoretical aspects, a more 
extensive discussion will take place in the analysis. With the concepts and theoretical aspects 
outlined in this chapter the data collected in the field will be discussed in detail, with the 
ultimate goal of answering the research questions as listed in the beginning of this thesis, and 
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Chapter 6 Analysis  
Based on data collected through interviews in the field, this chapter untangle and discuss 
various factors leading up to the 2018 conflict between the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups. 
While the focus of the study is on the 2018 conflict, it quickly becomes clear that the conflict 
is closely tied to the previous conflicts between the groups, local informants in particular 
placed an emphasis on historical events when discussing the conflict. Hence, the analysis 
considers the 2018 conflict in a broader context. A discussion of the interconnected elements 
takes place in the last part of the chapter, with the aim of concretizing the main points and 
findings of the project. Finally, the aim of this chapter is to present discuss the collected data 
in order to answer the following research questions: 
1) What are the root causes of the 2018 conflict between the Guji and Gedeo Ethnic Groups? 
2) Why did conflict break out between the two groups in April 2018?  
3) How does the 2018 conflict relate to the previous conflicts between the two groups? 
As outlined in the methodology chapter (Ch 3), this thesis makes use of a thematic analysis, 
which means that “the researcher closely examines the data to identify common themes – 
topics, ideas, and patterns of meaning that come up repeatedly” (Bryman, 2012, p. 578). The 
data collected in the field was coded thematically during transcription, and the following main 
themes were identified: Land, Referendum, Grievances, Minority Rights, Elite Instigation, 
Ethnic Federalism, National Context and Ethnicity. The chapter is divided according to these 
themes, in other words they guide the structure of the chapter. The conceptual framework 
from the previous chapter will be used as a theoretical basis, in the discussion of the data.  
6.1 Land 
Most conflicts are made up of a number of interconnected factors. When analysing conflicts it 
is therefore necessary to untangle these different causes and discuss each factor individually, 
to later understand how they all fit together. When I asked my informants what the core issues 
of the conflict between Guji and Gedeo really were the answers were diverse and complex. 
The conflict clearly consists of multiple factors and there is a long history leading up to the 
outbreak in 2018. As a starting point for this analysis, several informants mentioned “land”, 
as an important issue in the conflict.  
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“It is about land. This is mid-Africa, it is land. Normally in other countries it is the herders 
and the agriculture, like in Congo, here it is all about populations and land.” (Interview 7, 
Guji NGO-worker) 
The issue of “land” was predominantly mentioned as a contextual factor or cause, meaning 
that the informants would point to land and then go on to explain other issues in which land 
was a relevant factor. Therefore, it makes sense to consider this issue first, to later understand 
how it connects to the other identified themes. The reader will recall that we discussed the 
issue of land, and the Guji Gedeo lifestyle in a previous chapter (Ch 2, Context), this first 
section builds upon this information.  
6.1.1 Land Scarcity 
“Ownership or access to land is a key to the well-being and livelihood of many African 
families. Land is the single most important asset. It is a key social and economic asset, crucial 
for cultural identity, political power and participation in decision making, providing a secure 
place to live and a site for economic and social activity” (Gizaw & Woldetsadik, 2013). 
Ethiopia has a predominantly agrarian economy, which makes land one of the most important 
resources, as most people need land to make a livelihood (Haddis, 2016, p. 1). The value of 
the land was similarly expressed by an elder in the Guji zone “…the coffee, the false banana, 
the breeding of cow, all of this need what? All takes place on the land” (Interview 13). In 
other words, land is crucial for production and livelihood, both for farmers and livestock 
herders in the Guji and Gedeo zones. At the same time Ethiopia is the second most populous 
country in Africa, with approx. 108 million people in 2018, of which more than 70% are 
under 30 years old, indicating a high population growth in the last few decades (ETHIOPIA, 
National Human Development Report 2018: Industrialization with a Human Face, 2018, p. 7). 
Farming is the primary lifestyle in the Gedeo zone, the farmers mainly produce coffee and 
Enset (false banana). At the same time, the Gedeo zone is one of the most densely populated 
areas in all of Ethiopia (Senishaw, 2018). A government official in Yigetchaffer Woreda in 
the Gedeo zone, underlined the issue land scarcity presents for the local administration and 
the people within the zone. According to the informant the average amount of land per 
household in the area is very low (less than 0.5 hectare). Furthermore, a large number of 
people in the area are “landless” and hence unable to make a proper living for themselves and 
their families. Lack of land, the informant said, was a “painful” issue for them (Interview 23). 
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6.1.2 Resettling Schemes  
This “land issue” in Gedeo is nothing new and has been present for a long period of time, it 
was mentioned in research executed in the area as far back as the 1950s, and arguably has 
come to affect the lifestyle and history of the Gedeo. It has also affected the relationship 
between the Gedeo and their neighbouring groups (Senishaw, 2018).  
In the background (Chapter 2) we discussed how previous research has found that the 
Ethiopian government has supported Gedeo expansion into Guji areas since the beginning of 
the century, through resettling schemes for different purposes. These resettling schemes, 
dictated by the government, have resettled Gedeo into areas that were previously inhabited 
mainly by Guji over time. This has had longstanding consequences for the two groups up 
until today.  
Gedeo inhabitants in the Guji zone were often referred to as “guests” by my informants, who 
strongly felt that despite the longstanding presence of the Gedeo the land still belonged to the 
Guji. Even so, as my informants patiently explained, the Gedeo minorities in Guji might have 
lived in the area for 40 or 50 years (some even longer), many of them born and raised there 
(Interview 2). Yet, it appears they will always be considered as “guests” because of their 
ethnicity. Here, the 2018 conflict shares some common features with ‘sons of the soil’ type 
conflicts. As stated in the previous chapter such conflicts break out when the indigenous 
inhabitants perceive themselves as the rightful owners of the land, and therefore get into 
conflict with settlers (Elefversson & Brosché, 2012, pp. 33-35). This will be increasingly 
clear in section 5.3 where local inhabitants outline the motivation and rationale behind the 
violence that took place in their community.  
6.1.3 Pastoralists and Land Rights  
The Guji and the Gedeo lived together with close relations and much contact. Expressed 
through, for example, intermarriages, trade dependency, and sharing of certain cultural 
practices. In the background it was outlined that the Gedeo traditionally practiced farming, 
while the Guji on the other hand are traditionally pastoralists, focusing on livestock 
production. Research shows that pastoralists are often at a disadvantage when it comes to 
property rights and other political decisions (Hazen, 2013). That seems to have been the case 
for the Guji as well, as research strongly suggests that (governmental) decisions on land have 
tended to favour the Gedeo over the Guji. This is well-illustrated by the government’s 
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resettling schemes into the Guji zone, as well as the decision to hold a bare majority vote in 
the previous referendums, which some argue favoured the Gedeo. 
It is necessary to take note of the importance the land holds in this context, and how all these 
events have made it increasingly difficult to determine who “owns” the land. The history has 
blurred traditional demarcation between the groups, who already had close relations, which 
had consequences for the events that took place in 1995, 1998, and again in 2018. This project 
does not aim to say anything about who actually has a claim to the land, but it was obvious 
during interviews that conflicting claims came up (Interview 2, 19, 23, 30 & 33). We will 
revisit this issue in later sections. 
In the previous chapter we saw how Torbörnsson suggested that most communal conflicts in 
Africa originate in issues over land (Torbjörnsson, 2016, p. 16), that argument appears true in 
this case. Land and dispute over land is a contextual factor affecting the recent conflict 
between Guji and Gedeo. As outlined, land is a particularly valuable resource in Ethiopia 
overall. However, land scarcity and dispute over land in itself is not enough to cause the 
conflict, the groups lived together in the past despite minor disputes over resources. Much 
like previous research has suggested, it would be too simple to write this conflict off as a 
dispute over land or resources. This thesis suggests that access to land might work as a 
motivating factor of sorts, however there are other issues at play that bring the conflict forth. 
6.2 Referendum Rumours 
With these contextual factors outlined, before we discuss the core issues any further, it seems 
necessary to look at what actually happened between the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups in 
2018. With regards to the outbreak of conflict, one particular issue stood out. By far the most 
common theme, mentioned by the overwhelming majority, was a “referendum proposal” from 
the Gedeo minority in parts of west-Guji, in spring of 2018.  
This is a complicated issue, subject to much uncertainty. What we do know is that a letter was 
sent to the Oromia government, from the Gedeo minority in Kercha Woreda in the West-Guji 
Zone (Interview 16). The Ethiopian government has not disclosed the content of this letter, 
leaving large uncertainty around the letter itself. There was agreement among my informants 
that the letter at the very least was concerned with the rights of the Gedeo minority in the Guji 
zone, and in particular the use of their language – Gedeuffa (Interview 1). 
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“The people (Gedeo) complained, they raised this political question. Because our number is 
almost the same, almost 50 percent, we want to learn by our language... It is not their native 
area you know; it is the Gedeo that are living in Guji. But the working language is restricted, 
even in church or in preaching our working language is the Oromia language. Everything is 
decided by the Guji. It is the Gedeo that wanted to live by their language...” (Interview 28). 
The Gedeo minority in some parts of west-Guji is large, over 40 % informants suggested 
(Interview 2, 11 & 28). Still, my informants explained, the general working language in the 
Guji zone is Oromiffa, the language of the Guji people. Oromiffa is used in education, in 
churches, and in all other official institutions in the zone (Interview 1). Minority groups under 
the ethnic federalism have limited opportunities to express their culture in the public space, an 
issue in itself, that we will return to in a later section. And that was apparently the problem 
they were addressing in the letter going out to the Oromia Zonal Government in the beginning 
of 2018. 
However, soon after, rumours that the letter also included a proposal for a new referendum 
spread. Among my informants there was inconsistency in what this supposed referendum 
proposal had included. It seemed like the information was mostly founded on rumours, seeing 
that the government had not disclosed the actual content of the letter to the public. Still, the 
general idea was that the Gedeo minority in certain areas had grown quite big, and so they 
proposed a referendum with the aim to include some areas currently in west-Guji into a new 
“special woreda”, under the SNNPR with the Gedeo zone. The areas in question according to 
my informants were parts of the woredas Kercha, Hambella Wambena and Bule Hora, which 
are mainly areas close to the Gedeo border (Interview 30). 
“After they came to this place, they asked up to Bule Hora woreda, that is 3 woredas. “we 
have to learn by our own language, our culture is blocked”, and they wrote this kind of letter 
to Oromia government. Then Oromia government wrote a letter to the Zonal office (in West-
Guji) - how you can respond to this? After the community heard that - this conflict re-
erupted” (Interview 29). 
This caused outrage among the Guji population, who feared that they might lose this land to 
the Gedeos if such a referendum was held. The fear led to aggression and violence, and that 
was arguable why the 2018 conflict broke out. The referendum was seen as the main 
proximate cause of the conflict, among my informants.  
 
Page 60 of 96 
“What has probably triggered this conflict was related to the initiative of the Gedeo to call 
for a referendum to see if (parts of) West-Guji could become a Gedeo region, this has 
triggered reaction…” (Interview 35). 
In this situation there is a serious lack of verified information, which is a large issue in itself. 
For example, what the “referendum letter” contained is not actually known, so the violence 
that followed appears to be founded upon rumours that spread through the zones. One can 
wonder, if the letter included no such proposal, a disclosure of the content might effectively 
have calmed the situation down. I did ask some of my contacts at the zonal government in 
West-Guji about the content of the letter. The reply was that the issue was too sensitive to 
discuss. Local academics informed me that other researchers had received similar answers 
(Interview 10). It was in other words not possible to further verify this information. The 
uncertainty around this issue makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions, but the fact 
remains that the potential content of this letter was a cause in the conflict. 
It is of importance that my Gedeo informants denied that the letter had included such a 
referendum proposal, many took the time to explain along these lines: “The Gedeo do not ask 
to take land from Guji, but want democratic rights and to learn in their own language” 
(Interview 1 Gedeo official). One informant even reached out after the interview to clarify 
this specifically, showing that it was considered an important point among the informants. 
Within the collected data this was a point where a clear and consistent difference in opinion – 
between informants from the two ethnic groups – could be identified. In other words the Guji 
informants consistently claimed that the letter contained a referendum proposal, while most 
for the Gedeo informants either denied the existence of such a proposal, or underlined that 
they had no interest in the land. 
This referendum proposal was the most prominent proximate cause of conflict reported to me 
in the field, this letter and the rumours surrounding it were said to directly have sparked the 
violence that broke out in April of 2018. Having said that, there is much more to this 
referendum, and to the outbreak of conflict. 
6.3 Grievances with Past Events  
Within my data there were certain common narratives that emerged within specific groups. A 
perception among many of my Guji informants was that the Gedeo wanted to take their land. 
In Box 1 some direct quotes from the informants are listed. This section has to do with their 
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understanding of the situation, and so it is important to hear from the informants directly. The 















These quotations show that there was a perception among some informants that the 
referendum was part of a deliberate strategy to gain control of land, motivated among other 
things by land scarcity in the Gedeo zone (Interview 27). This narrative was particularly 
strong among local Guji informants, who explained their motives and feelings around the 
events of the 2018 conflict in their area. They expressed feelings of insecurity and mistrust, 
faced with the fear that the Gedeo would hold a referendum and “take” their land as they 
argued had happened in the past. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, land was an 
identified issue. In this section it becomes apparent that there are clear grievances with 
Box 1: “Land Grab” Strategy? 
“But as commonly known the reason (for conflict) is that in the Gedeo society they have very small lands, 
therefore they wanted to settle in the West-Guji land, and take the area, and to claim a special zone…” 
(Interview 6) 
“The first cause to get into conflict is land scarcity, the population increases and the interest in land increased. 
In Gedeo the population is high, they have great interest in the land. Due to this the two groups have interest to 
fight each other” (Interview 27). 
 
“The displacement crisis started, it exploded in April after a referendum had been called for to annex woredas 
that are under the Oromia region to SNNP region. What I know is that this is a strategy that the Gedeo ethnic 
group has been doing for a while. They go to a certain area that is right next to their area or region, then they 
have a lot of babies so they grow very big, the number of population become bigger than the current one that is 
already there, then they ask for referendum, and then they are the majority and they annex it. It happened for 
Gedeb and it was going to happen for Kercha I think. So when the referendum was called for, the conflict 
started to push the all Gedeo ethnic people back to the Gedeo zone, who had been here for maybe 20 years or 
more. The problem started on the border, but escalated to every area…” (Interview 7) 
“Know that the Gedeo people are those of who lived with Guji people for so many years, but you know these 
Gedeo people... are densely populated and there is scarcity of land. So dependent on this issue some minority 
groups just make up a political issue to confiscate the land, they raised this as a political issue and cause some 
conflict ideas within their society. Especially, to achieve this also… they preach in the church about the topic of 
conflict and just they move peoples for conflict. This is with minority groups. This is the case for the conflict at 
the time. But you know Guji and Gedeo tribe live for a long time, for so many years. But you know this conflict 
is not raised within this manner for a time, the magnitude is different this year. But the cause of the conflict is 
those minority people, who raised the topic of conflict to confiscate the land” (Interview 5). 
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previous decisions related to the land and the border. Those grievances become increasingly 
more apparent in these interviews with the local population.  
Informants from Garba, in Bule Woreda, in West-Guji, took the time to explain the situation 
from their point of view. The area is relatively close to the border between the two zones and 
has a large Gedeo minority, it was also one of the places where displacement occurred in 















I spoke to a total of three elders in the same community, all of whom expressed these similar 
grievances. In this case I think the informants expressed their feelings best themselves, in the 
quotes above. They placed an emphasis on the events of the 1990s, saying that the Guji had 
lost land to the Gedeo in the past, and therefore they could not be tolerant when news of a 
B x 2: Local inform nts in Garba town in West-Guji 
“Generally, this society is just brotherly and sisterly, we have been living together for many years, Guji and 
Gedeo. Displacement took place before this, in 1995 and 1998. But at that time, it was not this much because 
the Gedeo, those who are living close to the Guji, were small in numbers. As their number has increased, they 
get into this society in Guji and they started to ask for the land (referendum), they started to say “we are so 
many in numbers so we have to have our own land and our own woreda”. For example, the place known as 
Birbisa Bera which is 50 kilometers from Garba it was the place of Guji. That place is now totally occupied by 
Gedeo… Last year they asked referendum, in order to get 3 woreda. They said that we have to conduct 
referendum, because the number of population the Gedeo residents are much more than Guji. So then the 
locals in Guji said that… in those places we have shifted our land, we left our land for them. 20 years ago 
Birbisa Bera was that of Guji. Now they come here, and they asked our land - because of this we cannot be 
tolerant. Because of this we fought each other, the main reason is because of land he said…” (Interview 29) 
“This society (Guji), as you know have the Gaddaa system, many of those ritual lands (are now) in Gedeo. We 
have left all those lands, even around Yigetchaffer (now part of the Gedeo zone) we have ritual land, we were 
there during the DERG regime. Now we are pushed here, and now they even come after Garba. They are 
pushing us forward. Bule Hora Woreda, Hambela Kambela and Kercha, around 3 woreda they said the 
referendum should be carried out in these three woredas, because the number of Gedeo living in these 3 
woredas might be more than that of the Guji. So the Guji said that even though we left our land for them, they 
asked another question (referendum)… There are 5 or 6 kebeles, those kebeles are the place where Gaadda 
system take place, all those kebeles have already been occupied by Gedeo. There is such kind of grief in the 
community…” (Interview 30). 
“Ritual places which were before under Guji, are now under Gedeo. Because they lost all that, and those who 
live with us don’t live peacefully. They (Gedeos) rise this question in order to expand their land, this raised 
some grief in us, and in the new generation (the youth)” (Interview 31). 
“…generally it is not something targeted and it is not something planned. When they raised such a question 
the society could be not tolerant… It is because of only this, but its not planned, it is not to burn or to do bad 
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new referendum proposal spread. There was clearly a strong sense of grief and frustration for 
the land they felt they had lost in the past, and in particular certain areas with cultural value 
(ritual places under the Gaadda system). Grievances over these past events seemed to make 
up the motivation for the violence that took place in their community in 2018.  
In the previous chapter it was suggested that conflicts might turn violent when a group feels 
that their survival is threatened, and that argument is very much relevant for this narrative. 
Lischer suggested that fear (or insecurity) can become a trigger for (violent) conflict when 
“an oppressed group perceives a heightened threat to its cultural or physical survival” 
(Lischer, 1999, p. 331). This fear of domination or extinction can cause conflict, especially 
when the group thinks it can reduce or avoid the risk through use of violence. “A security 
dilemma and the ability to act determines when, and if, simmering ethnic tensions will erupt 
into violence” (Lischer, 1999, pp. 331-333). Among the Guji informants quoted above, one 
can identify feelings of insecurity and a perception of threat associated with the Gedeo and 
the potential new referendum. In this case the rumours of a new referendum presented such a 
security dilemma, which then led to violence and displacement.  
These grievances and insecurities were thus a partial cause of the violence that erupted in 
2018 – it appears the locals felt that they had to take action, or they might lose land again. 
This the elders explained was the reason why people were displaced and Gedeo property 
destroyed in their area in 2018. They did not deny that it had happened and seemed to feel 
that they could not be tolerant in this case. 
It was suggested in the conceptual framework that history can also have an effect on whether 
a conflict turns violent. “A history of inter-group violence, grievances, and fear reduce the 
sense of security and encourage resort to self-help tactics” (Hadiz, 2013). This is particularly 
true if the state cannot ensure security of its people. When people cannot trust the state to 
handle an issue, they are more likely to resort to self-help. The Guji and Gedeo have been in 
conflict twice before, and that has an effect on the 2018 situation. The informants clearly 
place an emphasis on what has happened in the past, and the land they feel that they have lost. 
Previous governmental decisions, it is argued, have favoured the Gedeo. When the rumours of 
a new referendum spread it appears that the Guji took the situation into their own hands 
precisely like this theory suggests. 
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As a concluding comment, this data is particularly important, if one hopes to understand the 
conflict. Insight into the reasoning behind the violence and displacement that took place in 
2018 is absolutely key to understanding the situation. Based on the information on this topic, 
it is evident that that the conflict and displacement of 2018 is directly linked to the 1995 and 
1998 conflicts and must be considered in connection to those events. Lastly, when outlining 
such a narrative, it is important to remember that this is one perspective on the situation. 
Recall from previous chapters that violence took place on both sides, and people from both 
groups were displaced in the conflict, so the narrative of the conflict might be different in 
other communities.  
6.4 The Role of the Elites 
As shown in the previous section, some informants expressed suspicion towards the Gedeo, 
practically claiming that they were seeking to expand their land as a strategy of some sort. My 
Gedeo informants – both in Gedeo and in the Guji zone – expressed no such ideas, and were 
quick to underline that they had no such intention. Most denied the existence of the 
referendum altogether and argued that they just wanted to live in peace. Among my 
informants a majority pointed out that if there was such a strategy it was not the work of the 
whole group, but rather a selected few.  
This was another key point that emerged during the data collection process. Informants on 
both sides were of the opinion that this conflict was not actually between the peoples of 
Gedeo and Guji. Near all of the local informants took the time to clarify this, and the 
informants clearly considered it an especially important point. Rather, the informants pointed 
to certain actors within the two groups, that had contributed to the outbreak of conflict. 
“Generally, the main issue is this; we have lost our land and those here are not living with us 
peacefully and they are asking things like referendum, in order to get an extra land. But, 
when I say this, it is not all of the community. There are some people who instigate this, like 
politicians, (they instigate conflict) in order to get their own benefit, there are such people” 
(Interview 31). 
Generally, the argument was that certain elite actors on both sides had an interest in conflict 
between the two groups and would manipulate the people for this. Informants pointed 
specifically to landowners, politicians, and religious figures, as the instigating actors. While it 
is clear that different types of people were involved, these actors can all be referred to as 
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“elites” in the society. The argument remains that these people were manipulating people for 
their own interests. In general it was said that that these actors raised conflict for their own 
benefit, whether it was land and money, or politics and power. The role of these actors played 








In the 2018 context the involvement of some religious leaders was specifically emphasised by 
the informants. In these conversations the Mekane Yesus and Kale Heywet churches came up 
repeatedly. An aid worker whom had worked in Kercha Woreda explained that “most of the 
people who are followers of... in ethiopia we call them Kale Keywet and Mekhane Yesus - it is 
a religious group. So, the Guji mainly adhere to the Mekhane Yesus, the Gedeos mainly Kale 
Heywet. So if you go to one Kebele where there are both Gedeos and Guji you will (often) 
find two churches, one Kale Heywet and one Mekhane Yesus” (Interview 33). 
This conflict first sparked in Kercha Woreda, and the same informant further explained how 







Box 4: Religious Actors 
“It was Sunday. I heard that in one of Kale Heywet churches for the Gedeo, which is in one kebele in Kercha - 
one of their priests preached, the people say that he said – “I saw it in my vision that this area, this territory, 
belongs to the Gedeos”. So, after it was said that peoples when they go out from the church, they started to 
chant and celebrate and they erected the SNNPR flag, and then started the conflict. That is the way everything 
started. They erect not the Oromia flag, but the flag of SNNPR - and everything started. That is the immediate 
cause I heard from the protestants there (in Kercha)” (Interview 33). 
 
Box 3: Elites 
“There are different actors here, for example different politicians, literate men. From both Gedeo and the 
Guji, people say “we are learned, we know the politics we know the economy”. They pulled the people to 
get into conflict, because they have some interests in the resources. The other one is different: the 
churches, the church leaders. They played great role, they take their agendas there, and they began to 
preach about what you call ethnicity, about politics, about the difference in church. Since they began to 
preach about this the people began to separate from each other … There are such political actors from 
both sides, from both Guji and Gedeo. For example, if you take Gedeo: they mobilize the people, and they 
would say “you have to expand your land, your borders goes to here” - around Bule Hora. “You can 
expand your borders”, they say, and they mobilize the people for this. If you take the side of the Guji they 
mobilize the people, and they say “you lost your land, the Gedeo is taking your land, so just you have to 
struggle and you have to fight against them”. So, there are two sides here. The people cannot understand 
these political issues, so the people get into conflict directly without any understanding” (Interview 2). 
 
 
Page 66 of 96 
 
 
This misinformation or manipulation from the elites appears to have taken place on both 
sides. According to my informants these actors played a big role in spreading the rumours of 
the referendum proposal and creating fear among the Guji population that the Gedeo were out 
to take their land. Hence, they were argued to be a main driving force in the escalation of the 
conflict into violence. In other words, specific actors might play a decisive role in violent 
conflicts and must be identified to understand the motivations behind the outbreak of conflict. 
“...the main problem was the speculating. The Guji were speculating and telling those who 
don’t know the information. “The Gedeo are taking away your (land)”, because the Gedeo 
are communicating with the government officials in order to get rights… at that time, they 
started the conflict” (Interview 22). 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that “elites, politicians or businessmen often use 
grievances for their own greedy purposes. There are countless examples of people in power 
manipulating local grievances for their personal enrichment” (Torbjörnsson, 2016, pp. 18-
19). And that is precisely the point here. These actors exploit grievances and insecurity in the 
population for their own benefits, consequently raising the conflict.  
In the conceptual framework it was also noted how ethnicity might not be a cause in the 
conflict, but rather could be used as a tool by certain actors to mobilize for and instigate 
conflict – in line with the instrumentalist approach. In this case, “conflict arises if ethnic 
groups compete for the same goal—notably power, access to resources, or territory. The 
interests of a society's elite class play an important role in mobilizing ethnic groups to engage 
in ethnic conflicts” (Reuter, 2017). Here conflict erupt between rational actors over scarce 
resources, often with elite actors as a driving force. In the discussion of the role of the elites 
this view is particularly useful.  
As neighbouring groups, the Guji and Gedeo are competing for the same resources, under the 
ethnic federalism (an issue further discussed in section 6.6). The motivations of the instigating 
actors were not elaborated upon by the informants, but certainly it appears to be related to 
factors like land and power. For example, if the referendum was held, and the border shifted, 
elites on the winning side would likely stand to gain both land and political power (see 
“I heard these two issues are at the centre of conflict, question of referendum and also religious involvement. 
There was false professing in the church, which says that “the land you have at hand now is yours”. That God 
said it, it was that kind of prophecy in the church, and that was the other cause of conflict” (Interview 10). 
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section 6.6). This is in line with the arguments outlined in the conceptual framework in which 
it was argued that “conflicts over authority often have a land component as power means 
access to land and vice versa” (Torbjörnsson, 2016, p. 16).  
The Ethnic Federalism has led to “…the politicization of ethnic identity as the primary 
vehicle for claims and entitlements to economic resources and political power” (Tefari, 
2012). In other words, mobilization of ethnic groups has become the main way to address 
political issues or gain access to resources. As mentioned in the conceptual framework, 
ethnicity and ethnic identity is particularly well suited for mobilization of groups of people. 
Rhetoric along the line of “This land belongs to the Gedeo, you have to expand your borders” 
on the one hand and  “The Gedeo will take your land, you have to fight them” on the other, 
clearly illustrates how the instigating actors made use of the groups ethnic identity to 
mobilize.  
In the literature review (Chapter 3) several points of critique towards the Ethnic Federalism 
was raised. It was suggested that Ethnic Federalism created “an incentive” for actors to 
strengthen ethnic differences and increasingly “mobilize on ethnic grounds” (Aalen, 2011, p. 
180). This has been raised as a weakness in the Ethnic Federalism that can lead to conflict 
between groups. Namely, that the way ethnicity has been politicized makes it easy to pit 
groups against each other, which then lead to conflict. Under ethnic federalism, ethnicity is 
directly linked with access to resources, politics, and power, which has caused concern among 
some researchers, who argue that “mistrust and hatred among ethnic groups grow out of the 
EPRDF's theory of governance” (Taye, 2017, p. 53). One can clearly see that the instigating 
actors of the 2018 conflict played on existing grievances and insecurities to increase the 
groups suspicion towards each other, and to mobilize for conflict. 
6.5 No Group Hatred 
Despite the suspicion and mistrust identified among some informants outlined in the previous 
sections, near all my informants took the time to point out that the conflict was not between 
the Guji and the Gedeo societies. This is complementary to the idea that some specific actors 
might have instigated the conflict. Well explained by one informant here: 
“The cause of the conflict has different stories. It is difficult to say why this conflict has re-
erupted, at this particular time, it is still an unanswered question. But in my view, I think the 
conflict is not between the two communities, not between the masses, the conflict is triggered 
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with certain interest groups who has used the communities to flare up the issue, and then once 
the community went into emotion then maybe this conflict has spilled into other areas. The 
reality on the ground, when you see is that these communities have lived together for 
generations, they have intermarried. Even when this conflict happened and many of the IDPs 
fled away, there are some communities who still remained behind, being from the other 
ethnic. This shows that the link between the communities are very strong. And the fight was 
not designed by the communities themselves, it is rather some interest groups putting their 
interest on the mass” (Interview 8). 
This point came up repeatedly during the data collection, with informants from both groups, 
and it was clear that the informants felt that it was important to clarify this for me, an 
outsider. I spoke to a returnee from Garba, in the West-Guji zone who had been displaced 
from to Gedeb in the Gedeo Zone for 11 months. He too, despite being displaced and having 
his property destroyed by the native population, argued along the same lines:  
“…the problem here is the referendum. He is from Gedeo, he said that “my family came to 
Guji in 1965, after the ethiopian calendar. My parents lived here, my family lives here, for 
over 40 years. We live together peacefully; we treat each other like brother or sister. Maybe 
some conflicts, but it is not serious like this one. This conflict is because of this referendum. 
But he said, what we need to know is - this referendum is not organized all by the Gedeo 
community, this is organized by the (land)owners and by coordinating with the religious 
leaders, and instigating the community. The frontrunner is generally those business people 
and the owners, generally they cooperate with the religious leaders. But not all the 
community” (Interview 32).  
When I asked if he thought there would be conflict in the future, he replied that such a 
question (referring to the referendum) must not be raised again, and that he simply wished to 
live in peace with his neighbours (Interview 32). Illustrating the opinion that most people 
gave to the same question, namely that they wanted to live in peace. Similarly, within my data 
multiple informants relied stories of the many ways the communities and people helped each 
other during displacement crisis: “Surprising(ly) the Guji society helped the Gedeo and... This 
indicate that there is no conflict among the communities, the conflict is of some individuals 
and investors, those to realize their own interest” (Interview 6). 
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This brings us to one last point. The letter sent to the Oromia government, the supposed 
referendum proposal, was – according to my informants – not supported by the entire Gedeo 
minority in West-Guji. According to the informants, it was composed by specific actors – as 
discussed above. And so, while some of my Gedeo informants expressed a wish to use their 
language and their traditional clothes and exercise their culture, “we want to teach our 
children in our language and we want to show our cultural clothes” (Interview 23). They did 
not express support for a new referendum (Interview 1, 16 & 23). Here the reader should 
think back to the referendums of 1995 and in particular 1998 (outlined in chapter 2) which 
previous research has argued were driven forth by the elites against the will of the general 
population. The 2018 referendum proposal appears to be similar in nature.  
When discussing the causes of the 2018 conflict, and in particular the proximate causes, it is 
important to take note of the role “rumours” and insecurity play in the society. While all the 
informants took the time to clarify the groups’ common ancestry and the fact that there was 
no hatred towards the other group, there still seems to be some mistrust between the two – 
apparent in how easily conflict broke out when the referendum rumours spread. This 
insecurity is noticeable in the groups growing suspicion towards one another, perhaps most 
apparent in the perception that the 2018 referendum proposal was part of a strategy of land 
expansion from the Gedeo. It is not surprising that such suspicions develop after several 
conflicts have occurred. From this section it should be clear that elites on both sides had a 
driving role in the outbreak of violence, most apparent through the church’s preaching and 
general misinformation of the people as mentioned above. It is worth pointing out that the 
lack of verified information in this situation, as discussed earlier, makes it easier for these 
actors to exploit the insecurities in the population and fuel the conflict. 
6.6 Ethnic Federalism  
Having discussed a range of different factors leading to the outbreak of conflict in 2018, this 
thesis identifies several structural issues at the core of the conflict. Existing research has well 
covered the role of ethnic federalism in the 1995 and 1998 conflicts. To repeat, the main 
argument was that the implementation of ethnic federalism changed the relationship between 
the Guji and the Gedeo and brought about new factors for conflict. The main issues were said 
to revolve around self-determination and the division of the two groups under ethnic 
federalism (as outlined in Chapter 2). My data suggests that the same issues were also present 
in the 2018 conflict. 
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Few informants would or could discuss the system in detail, some because of their position 
others because they didn’t “know politics” (as many would say). At the same time, the 
information that the informants provided – as discussed so far – clearly links back to 
structural factors under the ethnic federal system. There seems to be specific issues with the 
system, and/or the way it is implemented, that is causing issues among the Guji and the 
Gedeo neighbouring ethnic groups. Throughout the data collected in this project one can 
identify two main points: Disagreement over the Administrative Border and the Issue of 
Minority Rights. The previous themes have already touched on some aspects of these issues. 
6.6.1 Ethnic Federalism and the Border Issue 
Previous research established the border as one of several root causes in the 1995 and 1998 
conflicts between Guji and Gedeo. During the data collection period of this project the same 
issue came up again and again. The literature suggests that the border issue was never truly 
resolved, as none of the previous referendums were completed, and these findings confirm 
that. The supposed referendum proposal that sparked the 2018 conflict shows how the conflict 
still manifests in disagreement over the border between Guji and Gedeo.  
The implementation of the ethnic federalism is said to have changed the relationship between 
Guji and Gedeo. While their lifestyles in the past had largely been complementary and they 
inhabited parts of the same areas, a border now had to be drawn between the two groups. The 
reader will recall the issues related to land discussed previously in this chapter, these tie 
closely to the disagreement over the border. As stated in section 5.1 (land), drawing a border 
between the two groups was difficult for several reasons, such as the previous government’s 
resettling schemes, the Guji’s pastoralist lifestyle, and the groups’ intermarriages, trade-
dependency, and otherwise close relations. Nonetheless, the Ethnic Federalism makes it 
necessary to draw such borders between the groups, in order to create ethnic administrative 
units.  
“...the only situation here is because the rule the law says when there is a number of people 
(they) have the right to ask for referendum to change the situation of an area, they have the 
right to do it, and then when they ask for referendum officially it the government has a year to 
make the referendum. So, as long as this is possible they might still have the option of 
changing the geo-political situation in this area, and try to do another referendum in a couple 
of years. And if they do so it is going to become a problem, and if they learn the lesson from 
this time they might get armed too” (Interview 7). 
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Looking back at how the previous referendums were executed under a model of 50%+1 
majority, the equation is simply that the largest group in an area would win a referendum. 
This is a problem because demographics – as discussed – can and do change over time. 
Furthermore, under this system the proposal for more referendums might rise again in the 
future, in fact it is the right of the people under the ethnic federalism. Article 39 of the 
Ethiopian constitution gives the ethnic groups the right to self-determination and secession 
(Constitution of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1994). The idea that the 
border could be changed creates a sense of insecurity and instability among the groups.  
Within the categories of communal conflicts discussed in the conceptual framework, the 2018 
conflict between Guji and Gedeo best fits the category of “territorial conflicts”. Uexkull & 
Pettersson specifically point out that this form of conflict often revolves around “the borders 
of administrative districts, such as… the border of districts that are dominated by different 
ethnic groups…” (Uexkull & Pettersson, 2018, pp. 960-961). That is consistent with the 
findings of this thesis, as the conflict does revolve around the border issue. To this day there 
is obvious disagreement over the border, it is clear that the issue remains unsettled. 
6.6.2 Minority Rights Under the Ethnic Federalism 
Even so, the real issue is not necessarily the border itself. That is apparent if one considers 
how the groups managed to coexist in the past. Rather, my findings suggest, the issue relates 
to the consequences of the placement of the border. Certainly the issue of land is present in 
the form of land scarcity as well as grievances with previous decisions on demarcation. 
However, the disagreement over the actual border appears less important, as there 
traditionally was not such a border between the two groups. They inhabited some of the same 
areas in a relatively complimentary way of life.  
As discussed previously, with the implementation of the ethnic federalism the administrative 
units became mono-ethnic, and that seems to be at the core of the conflict. Due to the nature 
of the ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, which is linked to language and culture, the placement of 
the border in many ways becomes a zero-sum game (Ramsbotham, 2011). Here being a 
minority in the zone means losing the opportunity to be educated in your own language, 
openly practice and develop your culture. Seeing that the administrative zones are constructed 
on basis of ethnicity, the majority ethnic group in reality holds the (administrative) “power” in 
that zone. That includes the official language and expression and practice of culture in the 
public space. 
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While the ethnic federalist system was meant to recognize ethnic groups and avoid the 
domination of certain groups over other – this research finds that the rights of minority groups 
are still very much an issue. In this case, the issue was linked to the large Gedeo minority 
residing in West-Guji. This was mentioned briefly in section 5.3 and 5.5, when the content of 
the referendum letter was discussed. The majority of my informants agreed that the rights of 
the Gedeo minority in West-Guji hand been a part of the letter, and hence was linked to the 
conflict. To discuss the issue, I will first present some direct quotes, to let the informants 









To sum it up, in particular “language is a central issue. Gedeo want to learn Gedeuffa, but in 
Guji zone there is only Oromo language” (Interview 1). But it is also about the expression of 
culture, such as wearing the group’s traditional clothes, or practicing cultural rituals – and 
ultimately the groups identity and community overall (Interview 16).  
On the other hand, a Guji informant, explained that the Gedeo had to develop their own 
culture in the Gedeo zone only. “They (the Gedeo) have their own culture, if everyone want to 
develop their own culture and language… they have to develop in their own land. Here, 
maybe if they come for another reason, for business or something like this, they can do such 
activity, but they have to develop their own culture there in their zone” (Interview 29). In 
other words, the Gedeo have their own zone and should practice their culture there. He further 
explained that this was necessary to ensure their Guji culture.  
Box 5: The Minority Rights Issue 
“The main cause was regarding the border and the indigenous people (Guji) dominating the local people 
(Gedeo). They are not able to communicate with their mother tounge or local language, and when they 
reported it to the woreda government official they (the Guji) started violence against the Gedeo people... 
killing by beheading them and with gunfire and different things...” (Interview 22) 
“The Gedeo was communicating with the government officials in order to get rights. Because they are 
dominated, they are asking the government to speak in their language, their mother-tongue language” 
(Interview 22). 
“Near to two million (Gedeo) people have been living in Oromia region, but they cannot practice any kinds of 
Gaddaa system or their own identity. They lose their own identity, therefore they appeal to Oromia Regional 
Government to practice their own culture and learn in their own language… somewhere some Gedeo use the 
cultural clothes of Gedeo, which is forbidden... this is the immediate cause for this conflict... You cannot wear 
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The Ethnic Federalism does not state that minority groups should be suppressed, but that 
appears to be the consequence of the implementation of the system, in this case. Under this 
system recognized ethnic groups get some self-determination. It is therefore necessary to 
strengthen the group’s identity and distinctiveness from other groups. Furthermore, a 
distinctive territory becomes increasingly important under the Ethnic Federalism. For Gedeo 
culture in the Guji zone to grow strong could be seen as a threat. As discussed in previous 
sections, there is a bigger picture of insecurity in which the locals feared that the Gedeo 
would take the land, through a referendum. If such a referendum was held, and the Gedeo 
were a majority in the area, they could become a minority themselves. So, to supress the 
minority culture might be seen as necessary, to ensure the majority group.  
This stands out as a major flaw in the ethnic federalist system, in which the majority group in 
a zone dominates and minorities in reality have limited rights. The ethnic zones in Ethiopia 
are not homogenous, as we can see in this case. And the current structure is clearly a major 
part of the cause behind this inter-group conflict. It is hard to say if this is a flaw in the ethnic 
federalism itself, or in the way the system is executed here. Regardless, in the case at hand in 
this project, the ethnic federalist system clearly makes up a structural cause of the conflict. 
The constructivist approach to ethnicity and conflict – as conceptualized in the previous 
chapter – argues that “violent conflict is caused mainly by social and political systems that 
lead to inequality and grievances and do not offer options for the peaceful expression of 
differences” (Reuter, 2017). And that is precisely what can be identified through the minority 
rights issue and the border issue. Both illustrates how the ethnic federalism – in this case – 
causes inequality and grievances, while at the same time failing to provide mechanisms to 
resolve these issues peacefully.  
On the one hand this conflict appears to have been pushed forward by certain actors using the 
system for their own interests, by spreading incorrect information to the population and by 
raising the referendum proposal that ultimately sparked the conflict. However, the issue at the 
core of the conflict seems to be the groups’ rights under the ethnic federal system. As other 
researchers have argued before me, the system appears to pit the groups against each other, 
we can clearly see this in the 2018 conflict. These findings are largely similar to the root 
causes identified for the 1995 and 1998 conflict, in other words meaning that the same 
conflict issues are still present. Based on this we can identify the conflict as a recurring 
conflict, an interesting finding that will discuss further in section 6.9. 
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6.7 The National Context 
In light of these findings it certainly does seem like the core issues were not resolved back in 
the 1990s, just like Kinfemichael (2014) and the Uppsala Conflict Database suggest. Still the 
groups lived in seeming peace – or at the very least stability – for two decades. This far we 
have established that the main proximate cause that sparked the conflict was the letter sent in 
spring 2018 – and the rumours that it included a proposal to hold another referendum in some 
parts of west-Guji. We have also established that this letter – and hence the conflict itself – 
was driven forth by elites more so than the Gedeo population itself. Even so, one can wonder 
why these events took place specifically in the spring of 2018.  
While difficult to prove, some of my informants did suggest a link to the ongoing events at 
the national level. As several informants stated, the violence broke out within days of the new 
president, Dr. Abiy, coming to power (Interview 1). The argument seemed to be that unrest 
and instability within the national government helped bring up underlying conflicts around 
the country, which to some degree is supported by the outbreak of multiple conflicts in 2018 











Box 6: The National Context 
“The question was not last year, the question was for a long time, but the conflict came last year... after the 
prime minister came to power, within five days the conflict started” (Interview 16). 
“I understand, this has been ongoing for a long time. But why do you think it broke out specifically in April last 
year? …the main thing that caused this conflict to break last year is that there is a political crisis. A political 
national crisis” (Interview 2). 
“So then there has been conflict before, why do you think conflict broke out again specifically in April last 
year? I think the prime minister, Dr. Abiy, coming to the position or power… Soon after the war started” 
(Interview 1). 
“You said a lot about the root causes of the conflict. But why do you think it broke out specifically in April last 
year? Yes, particularly, conflict between Guji and Gedeo starts whenever there is problem at the centre. For 
example, in 1995, there was restructuring of the state along ethnic federalism, in 1998 there was also conflict 
within the ruling party at the centre. In 2018 there was also serious disagreement within the ruling party, which 
brought a new president from the other political parties to the power in Ethiopia. After the coming of new 
prime-minister to the power in Ethiopia, conflict erupted in so many places in Ethiopia. It is politically 
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The new prime minister, Dr. Abiy, entered office in April 2018 following a period of crisis in 
the government. He took a new approach to his role. Of particular relevance is the political 
liberalisation, by allowing opposition back into the country, and working towards democracy. 
Consequently, other groups have made use of this liberation to request for referendums to 
withdraw from their zones or regions. An example would be the election held in Sidama in 
autumn of 2019 ("Ethiopia: Abiy’s First Year as Prime Minister, Review of Conflict and 
Internally Displaced Persons," 2019). In the case of Guji and Gedeo, it is certainly possible 
that the period of political instability followed by liberalisation could have brought forth 
motivation among the instigating actors to raise this conflict again. In this case by sending the 
much discussed letter, by the spread of rumours, and by mobilising people for conflict.  
Clearly the core issues of this conflict are not new, they have been present at the very least 
since the 1995 and 1998 conflicts. Hence it is certainly possible that the timing of this conflict 
outbreak relates to the national context. Several informants did link the Guji-Gedeo conflict to 
the events taking place within the national government at the same time (Interview 1, 2, 10, 
16 & 18). But as we do not know the content of the letter that sparked the conflict, it is not 
possible to draw a definite link between these events. If nothing more, the timing is peculiar, 
for violence to break out within days of the new prime minister getting into power.  
In the end it is necessary to consider this, as the conflict cannot be analysed removed from the 
national context. In conclusion, the events at the national level might link to the conflict, but 
evidently it is not a core issue, rather it might have contributed to the outbreak of conflict at 
that specific time. Though, more evidence is needed to prove such a link.  
6.8 Ethnicity  
The last theme to consider is the role of ethnicity. It was argued in the conceptual framework 
of this thesis that one should not simply classify the conflict between Guji and Gedeo as an 
ethnic conflict without carefully considering the conflict in its entirety. This might undermine 
knowledge and understanding of the real causes or issues at hand, which in turn leaves the 
true core issues unresolved. Like discussed in the previous chapter, the conflict is indeed 
between two ethnic groups, which according to simpler definitions would make it an ethnic 
conflict. As further suggested, ethnic conflicts are often not over ethnic issues. And as should 
be apparent by the causes discussed in this chapter ethnicity does not appear to be a main 
cause in the conflict between Guji and Gedeo either. No informants suggested ethnicity as a 
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main cause for the 2018 conflict, and so it was the least common theme. Rather they pointed 
at a range of other factors, as seen throughout this chapter. 
Even so, the violence among Guji and Gedeo in 2018 clearly was ethnic based, meaning that 
people were targeted on the basis of their ethnicity. Such violence was experienced by 
minorities on both sides. Ultimately it resulted in a displacement crisis in which several 
hundred thousand people fled their homes due to fear of being targeted by such violence, due 
to their ethnic group belonging. This becomes increasingly clear when speaking to locals, and 
in particular people who were themselves displaced. Out of the informants that had been 
displaced most stated that they did not understand why the conflict had broken out, that the 
violence had erupted suddenly, making them flee out of fear. From the direct quotations 













Despite the causes of the conflict not being ethnic the role of ethnicity was present in all the 
interviews, for example in rhetoric of “us” and “them”. Or in the form of grievances or goals 
expressed on the grounds of ethnicity. One can also observe some suspicion towards the other 
Box 7: Displacement 
“Between Gedeo and Guji, when you talk to the people it seems they are not aware how it sparked. They tell 
you like: my neighbour started to ruin my house, started to shoot at me, cut the hand of my kid. So, it seems 
that there is an “ethnic spark”, but it doesn’t seem like people are aware of what the source was or how it 
started” (Interview 12). 
“Why did they have to leave their home? He said those indigenous people in the lands of Kercha just started 
violence against us, burning houses, killing children and elders” (Interview 34). 
“At the time suddenly we saw the home burning, and most of the people went to Yigetchaffer. But a person 
who can’t run, have problems to go. Elders stayed here and they killed them, around here you know. And 
everyone can’t take his property, his property stayed here and burned with the home” (Interview 20). 
“We had a meeting here with our leaders and Oromo leaders here, about conflict. Because the conflict was 
started in around Kercha. And that issue we discussed not to make conflict here. But after the meeting, the next 
day, someone started to fight at the border of Gedeo and Guji. But the source… we don’t know what happened 
over there, because this case happened in Kercha. We don’t know what happened. They migrated our people 
from Kercha, and here the people are living peacefully, but suddenly they start shoot at our people, which 
means... generally we don’t know the cause at that time. Because they are selecting our community from 
theirs, and they start burn homes and gunshot, just like that” (Interview 20). 
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group, among some informants, which is hardly surprising after three violent conflicts have 
occurred between the two. By mobilizing ethnic identity for political causes, as the elites have 
done here, it is certainly not surprising that suspicion and mistrust between the two groups are 
growing. As stated previously critics have suggested that hatred and mistrust grow out of the 
Ethnic Federalism, the data to some degree supports this.  
In the end, my informants still insisted that there was no hatred between the groups, they were 
brothers and sisters, and wanted to live together in peace. As discussed in depth already. That 
makes it difficult to attribute the conflict itself to any form of primordial antagonisms among 
the groups. This argument is strengthened by the strong emphasis many informants placed on 
elite instigation of the conflict, as we discussed in detail in section 6.4. Ultimately, that is the 
reason why the conflict was classified as a communal conflict rather than an ethnic conflict, in 
the previous chapter. People being targeted because of their ethnicity is a clear indicator that 
ethnicity is indeed a factor in the conflict, although not so much as a cause.  
More so ethnicity has been a tool, used by the instigating actors, much like the instrumentalist 
approach suggests. Furthermore, the root causes of the conflict have been identified as 
structural. In other words, the structure of Ethnic Federalism has created an environment, 
from which conflict issues between the two groups have grown. In the conceptual framework 
it was suggested that the instrumentalist and the constructivist approaches both provide useful 
insights into the conflict between Guji and Gedeo. In a consideration of the role of ethnicity, 
this is particularly relevant. It is through these mechanisms that ethnicity comes to play a role 
in the inter-group conflict between Guji and Gedeo. This is not a conflict in which primordial 
ethnic hatred can be found. Rather ethnicity – under the Ethnic Federalism – is emphasised in 
a way that causes the groups to compete over power and territory. These issues were not 
present in the same way before the implementation of the Ethnic federalism, and for these 
issues to still be causing conflict several decades later is reason for concern.  
6.9 Discussion 
Throughout these sections central themes were discussed in depth. Themes that came up 
repeatedly in the data-collection process were identified early on, these have worked as 
guiding topics for the different sections of the analysis. They were supplied with direct quotes 
from the informants and a theoretical basis from the conceptual framework.  
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Throughout the chapter I have shed light on different factors and perspectives on the situation. 
Furthermore, it was a particular concern to respect the informants, by highlighting things they 
felt strongly about and making space for their own words throughout the chapter. After this 
detailed discussion of the different themes, this section aims to finally answer the research 
questions of this thesis. The last section of this chapter presents a short discussion in which 
the main points are repeated and tied together, with each of the research questions in focus. 
1) What are the root causes of the 2018 conflict between the Guji and Gedeo Ethnic Groups? 
It is difficult to pinpoint the core issues in this complex conflict, in reality the interviews with 
my informants were long and complex, rarely one simple cause or issue was mentioned alone.  
According to my findings the root cause of the 2018 conflict between Guji and Gedeo were 
made up of several interconnected factors, of which the first relates to territory, in the form of 
continued disagreements over the administrative border between the zones. And the second 
relates to self-rule under the ethnic federalism, illustrated through the issue of minority rights 
and the implications of the administrative borders.  
Throughout the analysis these structural causes were identified at the heart of the 2018 
conflict between Guji and Gedeo. To sum it up shortly, the politization of ethnic identities in 
Ethiopia and the drawing of borders of administrative units on the basis of ethnic identity has 
created conflict between the two groups. The problem at the core seems to be related first and 
foremost to “self-rule”, in particular the rights of minorities under the ethnic federalism 
appears to be an issue here. It is clear that the ethnic zones are dominated by the majority 
ethnic groups, who dictates the official language and expression of culture in that area. This 
clearly causes some grievances among the Gedeo minority in West-Guji who wished to be 
educated in their own language, to wear their traditional clothes, and practice their culture.  
At the same time there are clear grievances with the border that was drawn in the late 1990s, 
Guji informants felt that they had given up land to the Gedeo and that these past decisions had 
favoured the Gedeo. Here the “territory” issue comes in. Under the ethnic federalism it 
appears that the border between the two zones in theory can be changed if another referendum 
was to be held in the border areas. This idea creates fear and insecurity among the groups. A 
consequence of such a referendum – if the Gedeo won – would be that Guji in these areas 
would become a minority themselves, and consequently lose a number of rights. This way the 
conflict revolves around rights. Both these issues persist as part of, or as consequences of, the 
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Ethnic Federal system – and hence they are structural in nature. Such structural systems 
causing conflict among ethnic groups, is precisely what the constructivist take on ethnicity 
and conflict seeks to highlight.  
Having pinpointed some of the root causes it is extremely curious why the conflict broke out 
specifically in the beginning of 2018, remaining dormant for 20 years. This leads us to the 
next question this chapter have attempted to answer: 
2) Why did conflict between the two groups break out in April 2018?  
This thesis finds, based on interview data from 37 informants in the field, that the supposed 
referendum letter sent out in the spring of 2018 is the main spark of the conflict. The rumours 
of a request for referendum from Gedeo inhabiting parts of the Guji zone created fear among 
the Guji that they would lose more land to the Gedeo, which led to the outbreak of violence 
and mass displacement. All the root causes listed above manifest themselves in this letter, and 
it is clear that the threat of another referendum brought grievances to the surface, on both 
sides.  
However, the majority of the informants argued they wanted to live in peace together. The 
main perception among my informants was that the conflict was driven by elite actors, 
landowners, religious leaders and politicians were specifically listed. In other words, people 
who have something to gain from conflict between the two groups. These people clearly 
instigated the 2018 conflict between the two groups, through the spread of misinformation, by 
urging people to take up arms, as well as through the referendum proposal itself, which 
sparked the conflict. Here insecurity and lack of verified information is a prominent issue, 
making it possible for these actors to exploit underlying grievances to mobilize for conflict. 
Lastly, one cannot exclude the possibility that events at the national level did play a role in 
the outbreak of conflict at this specific time. This chapter argues that the interference of elites 
is a main driving force for conflict, the findings suggest that these elites mobilized people for 
conflict by spreading false information and manipulating people to take up arms. It is 
certainly possible that the conditions at the national level played a role in their decisions to 
raise the identified conflict issues again at this specific time. More research is required to 
prove such a link, but several informants did connect the crisis at the national government, the 
new prime minister and his more liberal approach to the outbreak of conflict in April 2018.  
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3) How does the 2018 conflict relate to the previous conflicts between the two groups? 
That the 2018 conflict is related to the 1995 and 1998 conflicts should be obvious at this 
point. According to PRIO’s definition of recurring conflict, the conflict must break out 
between the same parties after minimum two years of peace (S Gates et al., 2016, p. 3). That 
is clearly the case – as a period of 20 years separate the 2018 conflict from the previous 
conflict between Guji and Gedeo. Furthermore, grievances related directly to the outcomes of 
the previous conflicts have been identified as a core issue, in fact the 2018 conflict appears to 
be a continuation of unresolved issues from the 1990s. That is in line with PRIO’s suggestion 
that conflict recurrence is often tied to the outcomes of previous conflict (S Gates et al., 2016, 
p. 3). Lastly, and perhaps most critically. The identified root causes are largely 
complementary to the ones found by previous researchers in studies on the 1995 and 1998 
conflicts, indicating the conflict is recurring over (mostly) the same issues.  
In particular, my findings are complementary to those of Regassa 2007 and 2012, in which he 
argued that the conflicts in the 1990s had to do with settling and determining rights under the 
new system, as that still seems to be the case. The issue of minority rights, and the 
disagreement over demarcation between the zones, indicates that the very same issues are still 
present. These core issues remain unresolved, even though more than 20 years have passed, 
and that is a concern. Conflict recurrence is a major issue, as well as a future threat to the 
security in the area. Having identified that these core issues are still present, they must be 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Key Findings 
This study have attempted to shed light on the 2018 conflict between the Guji and Gedeo, by 
answering the following research questions:  
1) What are the root causes of the 2018 conflict between the Guji and Gedeo Ethnic Groups? 
2) Why did conflict between the two groups break out in April 2018?  
3) How does the 2018 conflict relate to the previous conflicts between the two groups? 
Throughout the analysis a number of interconnected factors were identified and discussed in 
length. And so, while all these factors play into the conflict, the analysis concluded that the 
very root causes of the conflict revolved around territory and self-rule. These were identified 
throughout the previous chapter, in the border issue and the minority rights issue. Both 
appears to be linked to the ethnic federalism, and hence are structural in nature.  
It was possible to identify some narratives across the data. Among the persons interviewed in 
this study it was clear that the local Guji informants tied their motivations and the causes for 
conflict closely to the previous conflicts and in particular past decisions on the administrative 
border and the land. One could identify clear grievances that linked directly back to the 
previous conflicts. They expressed concern that a new referendum would take place and that 
the border would be changed– in other words, for them the conflict was over border and land.  
Among my Gedeo informants the perception was rather that the conflict revolved around 
minority rights and self-rule. The informants, and in particular the Gedeo whom lived in or 
near west-Guji, was of the opinion that they simply wanted the rights to use their own 
language and express their culture. Otherwise they wanted to live peacefully together. With 
the constructivist approach to ethnicity and conflict in mind: These grievances is brought 
forth by the system of ethnic federalism, and its failure to secure the rights of minority groups 
– as well as to provide a final solution to the border issue. This argument plays into the long-
standing academic debate on whether the Ethnic Federalism causes conflict between ethnic 
groups in Ethiopia, on the basis of the findings of this research project, that appears to be true 
in the case of Guji and Gedeo. 
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Even so this conflict came about mainly because of a letter that was sent from the Gedeo 
minority in west-Guji to the Oromia zonal government. There was agreement among the 
informants over the fact that this letter did include the minority right issue of the Gedeos. 
What brought about conflict, though, was rumours that the letter also included a proposal for 
a new referendum. The general idea being that the Gedeo minority in west-guji might be close 
to 50%, hence they could win a referendum under the 50%+1 vote system. The consequence 
would be that the border between the zones would change. It was this letter and the following 
rumours that sparked the conflict in the beginning of 2018. 
Even so, most Gedeo informants denied that the letter contained such a proposal. It was 
possible to identify that certain actors had worked to instigate violent conflict between the 
groups. A majority of the informants suggested that elites had exploited grievances and 
insecurities in the population, to mobilize the people for conflict. Here, it appears, ethnicity 
was used as a tool to mobilize for political issues. This is in line with what the instrumentalist 
approach to ethnicity and conflict would suggest. Other researchers have found this to be the 
case in many conflicts in post 1991-ethiopia – linked to ethnicity officially being politicized 
under the ethnic federalism. This lead to the violent conflict, and the mass-displacement of 
nearly one million people. 
The spark of the situation, in 2018, showed similarities to the conflicts of the 1990s. Certain 
elites pushed for a referendum, and manipulated the people for their own interests to get into 
conflict. These actors were the driving force behind the re-eruption of the conflict in 2018. At 
the same time some informants suggested a link to the events ongoing at the national level at 
the same time, it is entirely possible that the timing of the conflict does link to this national 
context. Though more evidence is needed to prove such a link. 
Regassa argued that the 1995 and 1998 conflicts were about determining the groups rights 
under the new system of ethnic federalism. And the findings of this thesis suggest that this has 
yet to be achieved. Conflict broke out over – largely – the same root causes 20 years later. It 
is still about the border and the self-determination, under the ethnic federalism. With the root 
causes being largely the same, as well as the conflict fitting the requirements for recurring 
conflict that were outlined in the conceptual framework, this thesis identified the conflict as 
recurring.  
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7.2 Why This Study? 
A few other researchers have studied the Guji-Gedeo conflict, and seems to be in relative 
agreement over the root causes of the conflict, so one might wonder why another study was 
needed. The simplest answer is that those studies took place before 2018, and hence the 2018 
conflict was not considered. An eruption of conflict requires new research into this new 
situation. It is necessary to identify what has happened, what caused conflict to break out, and 
al if and/or how this new situation relates to previous conflicts in the same context. This thesis 
is meant to supplement previous research, by looking at the newer 2018 conflict and its 
connection to the two previous outbreaks of violent conflict in the area.  
While it was not an aim to replicate previous research, I do find that a lot of the root causes 
identified in previous research are still valid and present in the 2018 conflict. Those findings 
were quite surprising to me as a researcher, and certainly not something expected. During 
data-collection it quickly became clear that the 2018 conflict was in fact closely connected to 
the previous two conflicts between the same parties. But it was only during thematic coding I 
came to realize that many of the identified issues were similar to those identified in the 
previous conflicts. The identification of these persisting root causes is perhaps the most 
notable finding in this project. For conflict to re-emerge after over 20 years of stability is 
concerning, because it indicates that the structural root causes are not resolved. If these issues 
are not settled it is entirely possible that conflict will recur in the future. Ultimately it is the 
people of the two zones whom suffer under this recurring conflict. And for their sake it is 
crucial that this conflict is handled properly, so that it will not recur again. 
7.3 So What Now? 
During my time in the field it was still much too early to evaluate the settling of the conflict, 
as the situation had just entered into the “early recovery” phase (Interview 8 & 35). Even so 
the aspects of resolution, peacebuilding and sustainable peace were discussed with the 
informants, to grasp the situation entirely. As this thesis comes to an end, I wish to highlight 
that this conflict has come about – recurred – because the core issues are not properly 
resolved, and sustainable peace will not be reached if they are not sorted out.  
There are already a number of peace promoting factors at work within and between the Guji 
and Gedeo ethnic groups. Both the government and the involved humanitarian actors are 
involved in the resolution and peacebuilding. But most noticeably, there are mechanisms 
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present within the groups own indigenous systems. For example, they held the Gondoro in 
2018. These indigenous mechanisms have widespread support in the community, at least 
among the informants of this study, and should be supported. However, Gondoro was 
executed after the 1998 conflict too, but conflict over the same issues still recurred in 2018.  
Due to the structural nature of the root causes in this conflict, it appears that some sort of 
structural changes are needed. For example, the conflict tend to manifest over issues related to 
the border. As long as this issue remains unresolved, and referendums can be called if the 
population ratio in the area changes, the same actors might push for referendums in the future, 
leading to more conflict over the very same issues. Like suggested in the conceptual 
framework, structural reforms are likely needed to solve the underlying core issues that cause 
recurring conflict (S Gates et al., 2016). For future researchers, I would highly encourage 
more research into the resolution and peacebuilding aspect of this conflict, such research 
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Appendix 3 List of Informants 
Interview M/F Occupation Place  Date Comments 
Interview 1 M Gov Gedeo, 
Dilla 
04.07.19 Zonal Office 
Interview 2 M Gov Guji, Bule 
Hora 
11.07.19 Culture and Tourism 
Office 
Interview 3 M Gov Guji, Bule 
Hora 
12.07.19 Zonal Office, 
Security (Translator) 
Interview 4 M Gov Guji, Bule 
Hora 
12.07.19 Zonal Offie, Security 
Interview 5 M Gov Guji, Bule 
Hora 
12.07.19 Zonal Office 
Interview 6 F Gov  Guji, Bule 
Hora 
13.07.19 Women, Youth and 
Children Office 
(Translator) 




Interview 8 M Aid Worker Guji, Bule 
Hora 
17.07.19  
Interview 9 M Gov Guji, Bule 
Hora 
17.07.19 Disaster, Risk 
Management Office 
Interview 10 M Scholar Guji, Bule 
Hora 
18.07.19 Bule Hora University 
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Interview 11 M Aid Worker Guji, Bule 
Hora 
19.07.19  
Interview 12 M Gov Guji, Bule 
Hora 








Interview 14 M Local Guji, Bule 
Hora 
24.07.19 Elder (Translator) 
Interview 15 M Aid Worker Gedeo, 
Dilla 
30.07.19  
Interview 16 M Aid Worker Gedeo, 
Dilla 
31.07.19  
Interview 17 M Local Gedeo, 
Dilla 
01.08.19 Elder (Translator) 
Interview 18 M Aid Worker Gedeo, 
Dilla 
02.08.19  
Interview 19 F Gov Gedeo, 
Dilla 
02.08.19 Women, Youth and 
Children Office 
(Translator) 
Interview 20 M Gov Gedeo, 
Dilla 
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Interview 21 M/F Returnees Gedeo, 
Yericho 
Kebele 
08.08.19 Group Interview– (8) 
2 - Women 
representatives (F) 
1 – Abba Gadda (M) 
4 – Elders (M) 
1 – Community 
Representative (M) 
(Translator) 
Interview 22 F Gov Gedeo, 
Yigetchaffer 
09.08.19 Women, Youth and 
Children Office 
(Translator)  
Interview 23 M Gov Gedeo, 
Yigetchaffer 
09.08.19 Disaster Risk 
Management Office 
(Translator)  
Interview 24 M Gov Gedeo, 
Yigetchaffer 
09.08.19 Culture and Tourism 
Office  
Interview 25 M Gov Gedeo, 
Dibandibe 
10.08.19 Kebele leader 
(Translator)  
Interview 26 M Aid Worker Guji, Bule 
Hora 
12.08.19  
Interview 27 M Aid Worker Guji, Bule 
Hora 
12.08.19  
Interview 28 M Local Guji, Bule 
Hora 
12.08.19 Group Interview– (4) 
1 – Abba Gadda 
(Guji) 
 
Page 96 of 96 
2 – Elders 
1 – Religious Leader 
Interview 29 M Aid Worker Guji, Bule 
Hora 
13.08.19  
Interview 30 M Local Guji, Garba 14.08.19 Elder (Translator) 
Interview 31 M Local Guji, Garba 14.08.19 Elder (Translator) 
Interview 32 M Local Guji, Garba 14.08.19 Elder (Translator) 
Interview 33 M Local/Returnee Guji, Garba 14.08.19 Gedeo Returnee 
(Translator) 
Interview 34 M Aid Worker Guji, Bule 
Hora 
14.08.19  
Interview 35 M/F IDPs Gedeo, 
Dilla 
17.08.19 Group Interview– (4) 
2 – Women  
2 – Men  
IDPs from Kercha  
(Translator) 




Interview 37 M Gov Gedeo, 
Dilla 
22.08.19 Culture and Tourism 
Office 
 
 
 
 
